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Watching Over, Watching Out: Lawyers’ 
Responsibilities for Nonlawyer Assistants 
Douglas R. Richmond* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers depend on the efforts and support of many different 
nonlawyer assistants to practice.  Law firms could not operate without 
nonlawyer staff.  Legal secretaries perform numerous tasks essential to 
lawyers’ work.  Accounting staff create and send bills, process fee 
payments, and manage operating and trust accounts.  In litigation 
practices, legal assistants—paralegals, if you prefer—manage various 
aspects of cases, prepare discovery responses, conduct fact 
investigations, research expert witnesses, and more.  In transactional 
practices, legal assistants frequently handle Uniform Commercial Code 
filings and other key submissions, perform various records searches, and 
coordinate the assembly and collection of closing documents.  Law firms 
with intellectual property practices employ patent agents to perform 
patent searches, prepare and record patent assignments, and prepare, file, 
and prosecute patent applications.  Summer associates and law clerks 
perform important legal research, draft documents for review by lawyers, 
and undertake a variety of other practical responsibilities.  Lawyers reach 
outside their firms for assistance from appraisers, private investigators, 
process servers, and e-discovery vendors.  Large law firms outsource 
various projects to a range of service providers.  The list of nonlawyers 
who regularly assist lawyers goes on. 
Unfortunately but understandably, nonlawyer assistants sometimes 
err.  Although it is lamentable, it is true also that nonlawyer assistants are 
occasionally guilty of deliberate misconduct.  Lawyers who are called to 
account by clients, courts, or disciplinary authorities for events 
attributable in whole, or in major part, to their nonlawyer assistants’ 
mistakes or misconduct may be tempted to shift responsibility from 
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themselves to their allegedly culpable assistants.  In general, lawyers 
cannot escape professional responsibility in this fashion.1  Under 
common law principles, a court may hold a lawyer responsible for a 
nonlawyer assistant’s conduct in imposing sanctions or when enforcing 
deadlines.2  As an agency law matter, a lawyer may be liable for an 
assistant’s errors committed in the scope of the assistant’s employment.3  
Liability based on the doctrine of respondeat superior is a settled aspect 
of tort law.  Finally, but critically, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 
5.3 and equivalent state rules frequently prohibit lawyers from 
disavowing responsibility for assistants’ conduct in the context of 
professional discipline by imposing broad supervisory responsibilities on 
lawyers.4  Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have adopted 
Model Rule 5.3 in whole or part;5 California is the exception, although 
the Golden State is headed toward adoption of the Model Rules.6 
The reasoning behind Rule 5.3 is straightforward.  Clients hire 
lawyers to represent them and, while they understand that lawyers may 
delegate aspects of their work to law firm staff, they expect lawyers to 
appropriately supervise the performance of those services.7  More 
                                                          
 1.  See, e.g., Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Ambe, 38 A.3d 390, 408–09 (Md. 2012) 
(facing discipline under Maryland Rule 7.1 for misleading statements on his letterhead, the lawyer 
defended on the basis that he instructed his paralegal to obtain new letterhead, but the paralegal 
failed to do so; the court rejected this argument because the lawyer bore “ultimate responsibility” for 
complying with ethics rules); In re Gargano, 957 N.E.2d 235, 238–39 (Mass. 2011) (rejecting 
lawyer’s attempt to blame his accountant for mishandling of retainer); In re Montoya, 266 P.3d 11, 
23 (N.M. 2011) (criticizing lawyer who attempted to deflect blame for missing deadlines to his staff 
for “shirking his own responsibilities”); In re Martin, 699 S.E.2d 695, 697–98 (S.C. 2010) (rejecting 
lawyer’s partial defense that his errors were attributable to high staff turnover and to staff’s failure to 
advise him about client’s attempts to contact him). 
 2.  See, e.g., Henderson v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 692, 703–05 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2010) (refusing to allow a lawyer relief from a missed summary judgment deadline where the late 
filing was principally caused by a paralegal’s misjudgments and mistakes, reasoning that the lawyer 
was responsible for supervising the paralegal’s work, and thus became responsible for the 
paralegal’s failure to timely file the subject document).   
 3.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006); see, e.g., In re Estate of Divine, 635 
N.E.2d 581, 587–88 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (recognizing that lawyer could be sued for malpractice 
based on paralegal’s conduct). 
 4.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2012). 
 5.  See Alphabetical List of States Adopting Model Rules, ABA, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_profes
sional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2012) (identifying 
jurisdictions that have adopted the Model Rules, including Rule 5.3, in some form). 
 6.  Renee Choy Ohlendorf, California May Get New Rules of Professional Conduct, LITIG. 
NEWS (Sept. 21, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/092111-
california-ethics-model-rules-of-professional-conduct.html. 
 7.  RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAWYER’S 
DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 5.3–1, at 1006 (2012–2013). 
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broadly, clients expect a law firm’s partners or shareholders to establish 
reasonable standards for the delivery of high-quality representation by 
everyone in the firm, and by contractors or vendors on whom the firm 
relies.  In addition, efforts at regulating lawyers’ professional conduct 
would be ineffective if lawyers could circumvent ethics rules by 
instructing or knowingly permitting lay assistants to violate them in their 
place.8  Model Rule 5.3 thus fits hand-in-glove with Model Rule 5.1, 
which governs lawyers’ supervisory responsibilities with respect to 
fellow lawyers, whether as partners or shareholders with overall 
responsibility for their law firms, or as direct supervisors of subordinate 
lawyers.9  Together, the two rules establish a comprehensive, flexible 
supervisory regime. 
Although lawyers’ supervisory responsibilities for their nonlawyer 
assistants seem obvious, lawyers all too often fail in them—or perhaps 
fail to appreciate or recognize them until it is too late.  There are 
numerous reasons for these lapses.  Busy lawyers must delegate work to 
their staff and, absent red flags related to staff members’ competence, 
diligence, or reliability, it is easy to become complacent as a supervisor.  
Indeed, the reality of practice is not just that lawyers must delegate work 
to assistants, but that they must also be able to trust their assistants, and 
need for such trust commonly dulls lawyers’ supervisory instincts.  
Lawyers may overestimate staff members’ capabilities and thus fail to 
appreciate the need to provide guidance or oversight.  Geographical 
factors complicate some supervisory relationships.  Lawyers sometimes 
employ relatives as assistants and incorrectly assume that family ties 
negate the need for supervision.10  In some instances, lawyers have 
                                                          
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (2012) (establishing “Responsibilities of 
Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers”).  For additional information on lawyers’ supervisory 
duties under Rule 5.1, see Arthur J. Lachman, What You Should Know Can Hurt You: Management 
and Supervisory Responsibility for the Misconduct of Others Under Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3, PROF. 
LAW., 2007, 18(1),  1, 1–2 ; Douglas R. Richmond, Law Firm Partners as Their Brothers’ Keepers, 
96 KY. L.J. 231, 236–46 (2007–2008); Douglas R. Richmond, Subordinate Lawyers and 
Insubordinate Duties, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 449, 451–58 (2003).   
 10.  See, e.g., In re Finestrauss, 32 A.3d 978, 979–80 (Del. 2011) (per curiam) (reprimanding 
lawyer for failing to supervise his bookkeeper-wife, who failed to pay various payroll tax 
obligations); In re Otlowski, No. 127, 2009, 2009 WL 1796083, at *3, *5 (Del. June 23, 2009) 
(reprimanding lawyer whose daughter stole from his escrow account); In re Shamers, 873 A.2d 
1089, 1094, 1098 (Del. 2005) (suspending lawyer for protracted failure to supervise his bookkeeper-
wife); In re Galasso, 940 N.Y.S.2d 88, 91–93 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (per curiam) (suspending 
lawyer whose bookkeeper-brother misappropriated client funds), aff’d as modified, __N.E.2d__, 
2012 WL 5199400 (N.Y. Oct. 23, 2012) (affirming violation of supervisory responsibilities but 
remanding for reconsideration of suspension as appropriate sanction after unrelated disciplinary 
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employed or retained nonlawyer assistants who were obviously unworthy 
of the attendant opportunities.11  Even more frustrating, from a law-
practice-management perspective, lawyers have employed or retained—
with little or no forethought or supervision—plainly unfit lay assistants 
whose excuses, perceived abilities, or purported reformation apparently 
overcame the lawyers’ better judgment.12 
While many of the reported cases arising out of lawyers’ alleged 
supervisory lapses involve lawyers in small firms and solo practitioners, 
large law firms have also been burned by nonlawyer staff misconduct.13  
Rule 5.3 does not expressly factor law firm size into lawyers’ 
supervisory duties, although the measures, procedures, or steps required 
to comply with the Rule necessarily vary with the practice 
environment.14 
                                                                                                                       
charge was held to be unfounded); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Hill, 281 P.3d 1264, 1268, 1272  
(Okla. 2012) (finding that lawyer violated Oklahoma Rule 5.3 by failing to supervise his office-
manager-wife, who vindictively misappropriated funds from the lawyer’s operating and trust 
accounts); In re McClain, 719 S.E.2d 675, 675–76 (S.C. 2011) (per curiam) (violating South 
Carolina Rule 5.3 by failing to supervise bookkeeper-wife, who was able to embezzle client funds 
from trust accounts as a result); In re Vanderbeek, 101 P.3d 88, 93–94 (Wash. 2004) (disciplining 
lawyer whose bookkeeper-husband habitually inflated clients’ bills; lawyer was not initially aware of 
husband’s fraudulent scheme even though minimal review of the bills or billing process should have 
revealed it).   
 11.  See, e.g., In re Maccione, 710 S.E.2d 745, 746–47 (Ga. 2011) (per curiam) (finding 
violations of Georgia Rules 5.3(b) and 8.4(a) but rejecting petition for voluntary discipline that 
imposed only a reprimand where the lawyer employed an investigator-paralegal who was not 
licensed as an investigator, who had no paralegal education, and who possessed a long criminal 
history, and the investigator-paralegal engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and stole from a 
client); In re Bennett, 32 So. 3d 793, 796–99 (La. 2010) (per curiam) (suspending lawyer for 
violating Louisiana Rule 5.3 where paralegal stole funds from trust account; the paralegal had been 
accused of embezzling $100,000 from a previous employer but denied those accusations and the 
lawyer continued to employ her but did not restrict her access to the source of funds from which she 
stole); N.C. State Bar. v. Leonard, 632 S.E.2d 183, 185–86, 189 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (involving 
lawyer’s failure to supervise assistant who was a convicted felon). 
 12.  See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Action Against Houge, 764 N.W.2d 328, 336 (Minn. 2009) 
(per curiam) (finding that lawyer violated Minnesota Rule 5.3 in failing to supervise a client who 
had been convicted of bank fraud and theft by swindle who the lawyer hired as an independent 
contractor to assist in the lawyer’s real estate foreclosure practice); Miss. Bar v. Thompson, 5 So. 3d 
330, 337–38 (Miss. 2008) (involving a lawyer who hired a convicted armed robber and forger as a 
paralegal).  
 13.  See, e.g., Ameet Sachdev, Ex-Mayer Brown Exec Allegedly Embezzled, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 
31, 2012, Sec. 2, at 3 (reporting that the former chief information officer at a respected global law 
firm allegedly embezzled over $850,000 from the firm during a twelve-month period); Bridget Heos, 
Ex-legal Secretary Pleads Guilty to Embezzling Client Funds, KC BUS. J. (Nov. 6, 2006), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/stories/2006/10/30/daily50.html?page=all (reporting that a 
legal secretary at a large Missouri law firm embezzled nearly $160,000 from client trust accounts 
over a three-year period).  
 14.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 11 cmt. g (2000) 
(“Appropriate measures for a particular firm must take account of the particular firm’s size, 
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This Article analyzes lawyers’ professional responsibilities regarding 
their nonlawyer assistants.  Part II focuses on the duties imposed on 
lawyers by Rule 5.3 and state equivalents.  Importantly, Part II explains 
that Rule 5.3 does not impose vicarious liability on lawyers.15  Part III 
discusses Rule 8.4(a), which states that it is unethical for a lawyer to 
“violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of 
another.”16  Cases in which lawyers are charged with violating Rule 5.3 
frequently involve alleged Rule 8.4(a) violations, as well.  Part IV 
discusses the other leading standard governing lawyers’ conduct in this 
context: section 11 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers.17  Section 11 addresses both professional discipline and 
lawyers’ civil liability.18  Part IV also discusses lawyers’ potential 
vicarious liability for their nonlawyer assistants’ alleged misconduct 
under the respondeat superior doctrine, as well as their direct liability for 
negligent supervision under the common law.  Finally, Part V explores 
four special supervisory concerns for lawyers: (a) the employment of 
family members, (b) the employment of disbarred lawyers as nonlawyer 
assistants, (c) the use of private investigators, and (d) the professional 
responsibility challenges that outsourcing poses when the outsourced 
work will be done by nonlawyers. 
II. LAWYERS’ SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER MODEL RULE 
5.3 
Lawyers’ many professional responsibilities include broad 
supervisory obligations.  Lawyers’ supervisory obligations regarding 
other lawyers are framed in Rule 5.1.19  Lawyers’ duties to supervise 
nonlawyer assistants under Rule 5.3 closely parallel their duties to 
supervise fellow lawyers under Rule 5.1.20  There are, however, two key 
                                                                                                                       
structure, nature of practice, and legal constraints, as well as the foreseeability of particular kinds of 
supervisory issues arising.”). 
 15.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(c) (2012) (explaining lawyers’ 
responsibility for the actions of another person within the firm). 
 16.  Id. R. 8.4(a).  
 17.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 11 (2000) (“A Lawyer’s 
Duty of Supervision”). 
 18.  See infra notes 194–201 and accompanying text (explaining this construction of section 
11).   
 19.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1 (2012) (“Responsibilities of Partners, 
Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers”). 
 20.  ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 7, § 5.3–1, at 1005. 
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differences between the Rule 5.1 and Rule 5.3 regimes.  First, lawyers 
generally must supervise nonlawyer assistants more closely than they 
supervise other lawyers because nonlawyer assistants usually lack formal 
legal education or training; yet, lawyers are responsible for ensuring that 
nonlawyer assistants perform their professional duties competently, 
diligently, faithfully, and honestly.21  Second, because nonlawyers cannot 
be held to the same professional standards as lawyers, Rule 5.3 requires 
that nonlawyer assistants’ conduct be “compatible with” supervisory 
lawyers’ professional obligations, rather than matching them exactly, as 
is required of subordinate lawyers.22  Rule 5.3 provides: 
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with 
a lawyer: 
(a) a partner, and a lawyer who individually or together with other 
lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm shall 
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures 
giving reasonable assurance that the person’s conduct is compatible 
with the professional obligations of the lawyer; 
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer 
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is 
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and 
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that 
would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in 
by a lawyer if: 
(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, 
ratifies the conduct involved; or 
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in 
the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory 
authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its 
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable 
remedial action.23 
Rule 5.3 recognizes that lawyers must delegate work to nonlawyer 
assistants but, at the same time, that such delegation must be 
                                                          
 21.  Mark L. Tuft, Supervising Offshore Outsourcing of Legal Services in a Global 
Environment: Re-examining Current Ethical Standards, 43 AKRON L. REV. 825, 831 (2010). 
 22.  2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 44.2, at 
44–4 (3d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2010).   
 23.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2012). 
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appropriate.24  The key to appropriate delegation is proper “supervision” 
by the lawyer.25  Supervision as contemplated in Rule 5.3 includes 
training nonlawyer assistants, but the concept is clearly not so limited.26  
Lawyers must also provide adequate instruction when assigning projects 
to nonlawyer assistants, monitor the progress of projects they delegate to 
nonlawyer assistants, review assistants’ completed work, and, as 
necessary, explain the ethical contours of assistants’ assignments.27  The 
intensity or level of instruction and supervision required will naturally 
vary by project or task and assistant.28  In any event, lawyers are 
“completely responsible” for their nonlawyer assistants’ performance.29  
This may be true even where the lawyer is serving in a managerial 
capacity rather than actually practicing law, although authority is split on 
this final point.30 
Lawyers may be held to violate Rules 5.3(a) and (b) even where they 
are unaware of assistants’ misconduct.31  Because violations of Rules 
5.3(a) and (b) rest on lawyers’ supervisory failures, rather than 
participation in or failure to remedy assistants’ misconduct, knowledge 
of assistants’ offenses is not required.32  Indeed, it is logical to assume 
that a lawyer charged with violating Rule 5.3(a) or (b) would not know 
                                                          
 24.  In re Comish, 889 So. 2d 236, 245 (La. 2004) (per curiam); Disciplinary Counsel v. Ball, 
618 N.E.2d 159, 161 (Ohio 1993). 
 25.  In re Comish, 889 So. 2d at 245. 
 26.  See, e.g., In re Quinn, 184 P.3d 235, 245 (Kan. 2008) (per curiam) (distinguishing between 
the lawyer’s training of her secretary and her supervision of the secretary’s conduct).   
 27.  In re Comish, 889 So. 2d at 245. 
 28.  DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND ET AL., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN LITIGATION 169 
(2011). 
 29.  In re Comish, 889 So. 2d at 245; see also In re Montoya, 266 P.3d 11, 23 (N.M. 2011) (per 
curiam) (describing repeated errors by nonlawyer staff as a failure by the lawyer); State ex rel. Okla. 
Bar Ass’n v. Hill, 281 P.3d 1264, 1272 (Okla. 2012) (“A lawyer is duty-bound to supervise the work 
of his hired hands.”); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Taylor, 4 P.3d 1242, 1251 (Okla. 2000) (stating 
that a lawyer “stands ultimately responsible for work done by all nonlawyer staff”). 
 30.  Compare Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Johnson, 976 A.2d 245, 266 (Md. 2009) 
(applying Maryland Rule 5.3 to lawyer-owner of title company even though lawyer was not then 
practicing law), with In re Marriage of Redmond & Bezdek, 131 P.3d 1167, 1171 (Colo. App. 2005) 
(explaining that Colorado Rule 5.3 applies only to lawyers engaged in law practice and thus did not 
apply to lawyer serving as minor child’s special advocate in a divorce case).  
 31.  See, e.g., In re Hall, 876 So. 2d 47, 48–49 (La. 2004) (per curiam) (finding violation of 
Louisiana Rule 5.3 by failing to supervise a disbarred lawyer employed as a secretary and paralegal). 
 32.  See, e.g., People v. Calvert, 280 P.3d 1269, 1283 (Colo. 2012) (explaining that lawyer 
could have learned of paralegal’s misconduct through “[b]asic oversight and simple diligence,” but 
even if he had “no inkling” of the paralegal’s misconduct, he still would have violated Colorado 
Rule 5.3(b) by inadequately supervising her work); In re Geiger, 27 So. 3d 280, 285 (La. 2010) (per 
curiam) (finding that lawyer violated Louisiana Rules 5.3(a) and (b) where bookkeeper 
misappropriated trust account funds without the lawyer’s knowledge). 
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of an assistant’s misconduct until after the fact precisely because of the 
lawyer’s supervisory lapses.33  Lawyers may violate these rules through 
conduct that is merely negligent.34 
The application of Rule 5.3 in practice raises several key issues, 
including (a) the identification of nonlawyers under the Rule; (b) the 
range of relationships encompassed by the Rule; (c) the contours of the 
Rule 5.3(a) requirement that partners and other lawyers with managerial 
authority make reasonable efforts to assure that nonlawyer assistants 
behave ethically; (d) the relationship or responsibility required for 
lawyers to have “direct supervisory authority” over nonlawyer assistants 
for purposes of Rules 5.3(b) and (c)(2), and what obligations such 
authority entails; and (e) whether lawyers’ liability under Rule 5.3 is 
direct or vicarious.  These issues are addressed below. 
A. Identifying Nonlawyer Assistants 
When deciding whether to apply Rule 5.3 in evaluating a lawyer’s 
conduct, it is first necessary to determine whether the subject assistant 
should be categorized as a nonlawyer.  This exercise seems unnecessary 
until one considers that lawyers and law firms frequently employ people 
with law degrees who do not practice law.  A person who holds a law 
degree and has been admitted to the bar but who is not practicing law is a 
lawyer, and thus a lawyer’s supervisory responsibility for the person 
ought to be controlled by Rule 5.1.35  In contrast, a lawyer whose license 
is suspended is considered a nonlawyer and therefore falls under Rule 
                                                          
 33.  Of course, a lawyer who learns of an assistant’s misconduct after the fact but while its 
consequences may be avoided or mitigated may have a duty to take reasonable remedial action.  
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(c)(2) (2012). 
 34.  See, e.g., In re Geiger, 27 So. 3d at 285 (concluding that lawyer violated Louisiana Rules 
5.3(a) and (b) through negligence); In re Mopsik, 902 So. 2d 991, 995–96 (La. 2005) (per curiam) 
(recognizing that lawyer’s Louisiana Rule 5.3(b) violation was the product of negligence); In re 
Craig, 454 S.E.2d 314, 314–16 (S.C. 1995) (per curiam) (determining that lawyer’s negligent 
supervision of employees violated South Carolina Rule 5.3). 
 35.  See In re Rost, 211 P.3d 145, 154–55 (Kan. 2009) (per curiam) (holding that an inactive or 
retired lawyer is still a lawyer for purposes of professional regulation).  But see State Bar of Ariz. 
Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 96-06 (1996), available at 
http://www.azbar.org/Ethics/EthicsOpinions/ViewEthicsOpinion?id=471 (opining that a lawyer who 
has been admitted to practice in another state but who is awaiting bar examination results in the 
forum state is a nonlawyer under Arizona Rule 5.3); Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l 
Responsibility, Informal Op. 94-80 (1994), 1994 WL 928052, at *1 (advising an inactive lawyer that 
she could work as a nonlawyer assistant to a lawyer who assumed responsibility for her conduct in 
accordance with Pennsylvania Rule 5.3).   
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5.3.36  Disbarred lawyers are characterized as nonlawyers and similarly 
fall under Rule 5.3,37 as are lawyers who surrender their license in the 
face of discipline.38  A law school graduate who has never passed a bar 
examination is classified as a nonlawyer.39  This would include a law 
school graduate hired as a lawyer but who has yet to pass a bar 
examination, as well as a person with a law degree who does not intend 
to practice.  Law students serving as interns, law clerks, or summer 
associates are nonlawyers for Rule 5.3 purposes, as well.40 
As for why it is necessary to distinguish lawyers and nonlawyers 
given the nearly identical language and operative effect of Rules 5.1 and 
5.3, the answer lies in the heightened supervisory obligations imposed on 
lawyers where nonlawyer assistants are concerned, despite the similarity 
of the rules.  This may appear odd in the case of assistants who have 
formal legal education or training, but it seems more likely than not that 
assistants with legal education or training who are not employed as 
lawyers generally (1) lack the experience that would support the lighter 
supervision typically afforded lawyers; (2) have responsibilities or roles 
materially different from those usually held or filled by lawyers; or (3) 
are in nonlawyer roles because they are somehow unfit, unsuited, or 
unqualified to practice as lawyers.  Regardless, a different level or scope 
of supervision is in order. 
B. The Nature and Scope of Covered Relationships 
After deciding whether a person for whose conduct a lawyer is 
allegedly responsible qualifies as a nonlawyer assistant, the next question 
is whether the assistant is “employed or retained by or associated with” 
the lawyer.41  There should be no debate over lawyers’ duty to supervise 
                                                          
 36.  Neb. State Bar Ass’n Lawyers Adv. Comm., Advisory Op. No. 11-01, at 5 (2011) 
[hereinafter Neb. Op. No. 11-01], available at http://www.supremecourt.ne.gov/professional-
ethics/lawyers/ethics-pdfs/2000s/11-01.pdf; Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l 
Responsibility, Informal Op. 93-92B (1993), 1993 WL 851212, at *1. 
 37.  In re Juhnke, 41 P.3d 855, 859–60 (Kan. 2002) (per curiam); In re Comish, 889 So. 2d 236, 
244–45 (La. 2004) (per curiam); Neb. Op. No. 11-01, supra note 36, at 5. 
 38.  Neb. Op. No. 11-01, supra note 36, at 5. 
 39.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 (2000) (stating that a 
person becomes a lawyer “[u]pon admission to the bar of any jurisdiction”). 
 40.  Copeland v. D.C. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 3 A.3d 331, 336 & n.15 (D.C. 2010); Stewart v. 
Bee-Dee Neon & Signs, Inc., 751 So. 2d 196, 207 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Att’y Grievance 
Comm’n of Md. v. Jaseb, 773 A.2d 516, 524 (Md. 2001); Utah State Bar Ethics Adv. Op. Comm., 
Adv. Op. 11-03 (2011), 2011 WL 6143437, at *1–2.   
 41.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2012). 
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their employees.  As the quoted language makes clear, however, lawyers’ 
supervisory responsibilities are generally broader than that and 
encompass independent contractors who assist them,42 such as computer 
or information technology consultants,43 independent or freelance 
paralegals,44 interpreters or translators,45 investigators,46 or title 
abstractors.47  Lawyers generally cannot escape discipline under Rule 5.3 
on the ground that an errant assistant was an independent contractor 
rather than an employee.48 
In re Flack49 illustrates the potential reach of Rule 5.3.  In that case, 
lawyer Stephen Flack entered into an agreement with ALMS, Ltd., 
whereby ALMS representatives sent mass mailings to targeted Kansas 
and Missouri residents promoting Flack’s estate planning services.50  
ALMS representatives spoke with people who responded to the mailings 
and used Flack’s name in conducting interviews, explaining the 
documents to be prepared and services to be provided, and enlisting 
clients and collecting fees.51  ALMS employees prepared all will, trust, 
power of attorney, and other documents in Flack’s name.52  None of the 
ALMS representatives were lawyers.53  Flack knew that the ALMS 
representatives were conducting these activities in his name, even though 
he did not know the names of the people on ALMS’s mailing list; in fact, 
he did not learn his clients’ identities until after they had been enlisted by 
                                                          
 42.  Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 98-26 (1998), 1998 WL 988216, at 
*3; Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 98-75 (1998), 1998 
WL 988168, at *1 [hereinafter Pa. Eth. Op. 98-75].   
 43.  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-398, at 1–2 (1995); Pa. Bar 
Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 2005-105 (2005), 2005 WL 
2291093, at *1; Vt. Bar Ass’n, Adv. Ethics Op. 2003-03, at 3 (2003). 
 44.  State Bar of Ariz. Comm. on Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 98-08, at 2–3 (1998); 
S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Ethics Adv. Op. 96-13 (1996), 1996 WL 1101751, at *1. 
 45.  Ill. State Bar Ass’n, Adv. Op. 03-07 (2004), 2004 WL 3684087, at *2. 
 46.  D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 321 (2003); State Bar of Mich. Standing Comm. on 
Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Op. RI-315 (1999), 1999 WL 33135105, at *3. 
 47.  N.C. State Bar, 99 Formal Op. 6 (1999), 1999 WL 33262183, at *1. 
 48.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 cmt. 2 (2012) (explaining that nonlawyer 
assistants who are independent contractors nonetheless “act for the lawyer in rendition of the 
lawyer’s professional services”); see, e.g., People v. Calvert, 280 P.3d 1269, 1282–83 (Colo. 2012) 
(rejecting lawyer’s defense that paralegal was a “rogue” who engaged in the unauthorized practice of 
law on behalf of her own company in concluding that lawyer violated Colorado Rule 5.3(b)). 
 49.  33 P.3d 1281 (Kan. 2001) (per curiam). 
 50.  Id. at 1283. 
 51.  Id.  ALMS representatives collected a $1,995 attorney’s fee from each client; of that fee, 
Flack paid $1,745 to ALMS.  Id.   
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
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ALMS and paid the requested fee.54  Once ALMS completed the various 
estate planning documents, it sent them to Flack.55  Suffice it to say that 
Flack “exercised little or no supervision” over the ALMS representatives 
acting on his behalf.56 
Regrettably, ALMS representatives defrauded several clients.57  
Kansas disciplinary authorities charged Flack with violating Kansas 
Rules 5.3(b) and (c) as a result.58  A disciplinary panel concluded that 
Flack violated the Rules by failing to supervise the ALMS 
representatives and neglecting to ensure that their activities were 
compatible with his professional obligations as a lawyer.59  The Kansas 
Supreme Court ultimately agreed and suspended Flack from practice for 
six months, followed by a two-year period of probation and intense 
practice supervision.60 
It is easy to discount the decision in In re Flack as the foreseeable 
consequence of a harebrained business development scheme.  The case is 
instructive, however, in that the court easily held the lawyer accountable 
for the misconduct of an independent contractor and its employees.61  
The fact that Flack did not control the details of the ALMS 
representatives’ activities was no bar to discipline under Rule 5.3.62 
Although it is relatively easy to gauge whether a lawyer employed or 
retained a nonlawyer assistant, it is harder to evaluate relationships in 
which a lay assistant might reasonably be characterized as being 
“associated with” a lawyer for purposes of Rule 5.3.63  This third 
category of lawyer–assistant relationships could be read to include 
typical employer–employee and independent contractor arrangements, 
but it must extend beyond those or else the “associated with” language in 
the Rule is superfluous.64  A person might foreseeably be associated with 
                                                          
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 1283–85. 
 58.  Id. at 1288. 
 59.  Id. at 1287. 
 60.  Id. at 1290–91. 
 61.  See id.  
 62.  See id. at 1288–89 (noting that client disclosures and consents in the forms used by ALMS 
did not relieve Flack of his duties under rules of professional conduct). 
 63.  See generally S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Adv. Op. 05-12 (2005), 2005 WL 
1704511, at *4 (stating that “[a]ssociation” as used in Rule 5.3 “does not mean direct employment”). 
 64.  Courts interpret ethics rules according to the same principles that govern statutory 
interpretation.  Rubsenstein v. Statewide Grievance Comm., No. CV020516965S, 2003 WL 
21499265, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 10, 2003) (citing Doe v. Conn. Bar Exam’g Comm., 818 
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a lawyer for Rule 5.3 purposes where (1) the lawyer asks the person to 
assist with a project or task related to the lawyer’s practice but does not 
compensate the person; (2) the person is employed by the lawyer’s client, 
and the client assigns or instructs the person to assist the lawyer in the 
representation; or (3) the person offers to assist the lawyer in an aspect of 
the lawyer’s practice and the lawyer accepts the offer.  In In re Cline,65 
for example, the Louisiana Supreme Court applied Rule 5.3 to a lawyer’s 
supervision of a client who offered to assist the lawyer in completing the 
settlement of the client’s case. 
Leonard Cline represented Patsy Allday in a personal injury matter.66  
Allday had previously been represented in the case by Morris Bart.67  
When Cline settled the case, the insurer paying the settlement, State 
Farm, included Bart as a payee on the two settlement drafts.68  Allday did 
not want to wait for Cline to obtain Bart’s signature on the drafts, so she 
offered to take them to Bart’s office to obtain his endorsement.69  Cline 
“saw nothing wrong with this proposal.”70  Allday returned with the two 
drafts ostensibly bearing Bart’s signature, and Cline deposited the drafts 
into his trust account.71  In fact, Bart’s signature was forged.72  Allday 
unconvincingly denied any role in the forgery.73  Louisiana disciplinary 
authorities charged Cline with violating Louisiana Rule 5.3(b), and the 
case ultimately reached the Louisiana Supreme Court.74 
Cline admitted that he delegated authority for obtaining Bart’s 
signatures on the two settlement drafts to Allday, while acknowledging 
that this “was a deviation from his normal office procedures.”75  The 
court observed that Cline had failed to take even “minimal steps” to 
ensure that the drafts were appropriately transmitted to Bart for his 
                                                                                                                       
A.2d 14, 29 (Conn. 2003)); In re Marriage of Stephenson, 955 N.E.2d 618, 626 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).  
When interpreting a statute, a court reads the text so that no word or phrase is rendered superfluous.  
Frey v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 29 A.3d 475, 517 (Md. 2011) (quoting Chow v. State, 903 A.2d 
388, 395 (Md. 2006)).  Thus, courts should read rules of professional conduct in ways that do not 
render any language in them superfluous.   
 65.  756 So. 2d 284 (La. 2000) (per curiam). 
 66.  Id. at 285. 
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Id. at 286. 
 69.  Id. at 287. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. at 286. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  See id. at 287 (stating “I sure don’t remember doing it if I did it”). 
 74.  Id. at 286. 
 75.  Id. at 289. 
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endorsement, such as calling Bart to tell him that Allday was en route to 
his office with the drafts.76  It was clear that Cline had not made 
reasonable efforts to safeguard the settlement drafts he entrusted to 
Allday and that, in doing so, he violated the Rule 5.3(b) mandate “that 
with respect to a non-lawyer employed, retained or associated by the 
lawyer, a lawyer must make ‘reasonable efforts to ensure that the 
person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the 
lawyer.’”77  Based on Cline’s disciplinary history, the court suspended 
him from practice for six months with three months deferred, rather than 
issuing a public reprimand—the ordinary sanction for a Rule 5.3 
violation.78 
The In re Cline holding is understandable.  Allday was not Cline’s 
employee, nor did he retain her for the purpose of obtaining Bart’s 
signatures on the drafts.  She was, however, properly described as being 
associated with him in the task of obtaining Bart’s endorsements on the 
settlement drafts.  The case is unusual because Allday was Cline’s client 
as well as his assistant for a discrete purpose, but the result would have 
been the same had someone else volunteered her services as a courier 
and then forged Bart’s name on the drafts for some reason. 
C. The Structural Requirement of Rule 5.3(a) 
As noted earlier, clients who hire lawyers to represent them 
understand that lawyers must delegate some work to nonlawyers, but 
they expect their lawyers to ensure that delegated work is done right.  
Courts and disciplinary authorities recognize that lawyers must rely on 
nonlawyer assistants in their practices, but they also appreciate the 
potential for associated misconduct and know that sound policies, 
practices, and procedures reduce this possibility.  Model Rule 5.3(a) 
accordingly provides that: 
A partner [in a law firm], and a lawyer who individually or together 
with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law 
firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect 
measures giving reasonable assurance that the person’s conduct is 
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.79 
                                                          
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. (quoting LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(b)). 
 78.  Id. at 289–90. 
 79.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(a) (2012). 
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Although Rule 5.3(a) refers to partners in law firms, it applies 
equally to shareholders in firms organized as professional corporations, 
members in firms organized as limited liability companies, lawyers 
practicing as sole proprietors or in other forms of association, and 
comparable lawyers in government agencies, legal services 
organizations, and corporate law departments.80  In short, the Rule 
requires lawyers with managerial authority to structure their firms or 
practices to reasonably assure professionally responsible behavior by 
nonlawyer assistants.81  It is the lawyer, not the lawyer’s staff, who is 
ultimately responsible for the competent representation of clients.82 
Partners who fail to structure their firms or practices to reasonably 
assure that nonlawyer assistants perform their duties compatibly with the 
partners’ professional obligations violate Rule 5.3(a), even in the absence 
of misconduct by an assistant.83  The chance that disciplinary authorities 
would charge a violation in that circumstance is remote, but it is 
possible.84  Conversely, partners who appropriately structure their firms 
or practices fulfill their Rule 5.3(a) obligations even though an assistant 
errs or commits misconduct.85  Compliance with the structural 
requirements of Rule 5.3(a), however, is not a cure-all.  Lawyers who 
have fulfilled their duties under Rule 5.3(a) nonetheless may be charged 
with violating Rule 5.3(b) or (c) if they fail in their role as direct 
supervisors.86  Moreover, lawyers who instruct assistants to behave 
unethically or who ratify assistants’ misconduct clearly violate Rule 
5.3(a) in addition to Rule 5.3(b) or (c).87  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine 
a more fundamental structural failure. 
                                                          
 80.  See id. R. 1.0(c) (explaining “firm” and “law firm” terminology in the Model Rules).   
 81.  See Nathan M. Crystal, Ethical Obligations in Using Paralegals, 21 S.C. LAW. 8, 8 (2009) 
(describing Rule 5.3(a) as imposing a “structural obligation”). 
 82.  In re Montoya, 266 P.3d 11, 23 (N.M. 2011) (per curiam); Walker v. State, 723 S.E.2d 610, 
615 (S.C. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing a lawyer’s duties without reference to Rule 5.3). 
 83.  2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 22, § 44.4, at 44-4.1. 
 84.  See Julie R. O’Sullivan, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?  A Response to Professor 
Schneyer’s Proposal, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 8 (2002) (stating that while lawyers may be 
disciplined for failing to implement reasonable internal controls even if no other ethics breach has 
yet occurred, in practice, the Rule 5.3(a) prophylactic standard is enforced only when other rules are 
also violated).   
 85.  See, e.g., People v. Smith, 74 P.3d 566, 571 (Colo. 2003) (dismissing alleged Colorado 
Rule 5.3(a) violation where lawyer had measures in place to reasonably assure that he was made 
aware of all communications with his office but his legal assistant did not follow them).  
 86.  Id. at 571–72; Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Glenn, 671 A.2d 463, 470–72, 478–79 
(Md. 1996). 
 87.  Cincinnati Bar Ass’n v. Lawson, 891 N.E.2d 749, 758 (Ohio 2008) (per curiam).  
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So what policies or procedures must a lawyer or law firm adopt or 
institute to comply with Rule 5.3(a)?  The answer depends on the 
circumstances.88  Law firms and law practices are not uniform.  
Reasonable measures for any firm must factor in the firm’s “size, 
structure, nature of practice, and legal constraints, as well as the 
foreseeability of particular kinds of supervisory issues arising.”89  
Generally, lawyers must take steps to ensure that nonlawyer assistants 
are competent, diligent in adhering to deadlines and performing other 
responsibilities in serving clients, avoid conflicts of interest, 
appropriately handle client and law firm funds, and appropriately bill 
their time if they are timekeepers.90  Lawyers must further ensure that 
nonlawyer assistants understand confidentiality obligations, 
communicate honestly with clients and others, and avoid the 
unauthorized practice of law.91  Lawyers who typically represent 
plaintiffs in litigation should implement policies and procedures to 
ensure that staff members act compatibly with the lawyers’ professional 
duties concerning settlements.92  Regardless of the specific firm or 
practice type, the first step in this process is thoughtful pre-employment 
or pre-retention interviewing and careful scrutiny of candidates for 
positions.93 
Can it truly be that all partners in a law firm are responsible for 
making reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm implements measures to 
reasonably assure that nonlawyer assistants act compatibly with the 
lawyers’ professional obligations?  The text of Model Rule 5.3(a) 
supplies an affirmative answer to this question, but the requirement is not 
as onerous as it initially appears.  First, the extent of this duty 
“corresponds to the lawyer’s practical ability to know matters and effect 
appropriate changes within the firm.”94  Thus, the two partners who 
comprise the entire partnership of a small law firm rightfully bear equal 
responsibility for erecting and maintaining their firm’s ethical structure, 
while rank-and-file partners in a large law firm with multiple offices owe 
                                                          
 88.  2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 22, § 44.4, at 44-4.1. 
 89.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 11 cmt. g (2000). 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Pa. Eth. Op. 98-75, supra note 42, at *2–4.  
 92.  See, e.g., Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Mills, 318 S.W.3d 89, 93 (Ky. 2010) (disbarring lawyer for 
violating Kentucky Rule 5.3(a), among many other violations). 
 93.  See 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 22, § 44.4, at 44-4.1 (stating that “[c]ertainly, new 
personnel must be interviewed carefully prior to employment”). 
 94.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 11 cmt. g (2000). 
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substantially more limited duties.95  Second, partners may delegate their 
supervisory responsibilities under Rule 5.3(a) to other lawyers—such as 
managing partners, management committees, or practice group leaders—
or to nonlawyers—such as law firm administrators or office managers—
whom the partners reasonably believe are capable of fulfilling them.96  
Naturally, nonlawyers in supervisory roles must be appropriately 
supervised.97  And, if a lawyer or nonlawyer to whom such 
responsibilities were delegated were to prove incapable of fulfilling 
them, the partners would have to take reasonable remedial measures.98 
Law firm leaders must take their Rule 5.3 duties especially seriously, 
as five related cases from Louisiana illustrate.  The five lawyers in those 
cases comprised the management committee of Breazeale, Sachse & 
Wilson, L.L.P. (BSW), a Baton Rouge law firm with over seventy 
lawyers.99  The factual basis for the lawyers’ discipline was bizarre.  A 
nonlawyer employee who was responsible for the content of BSW’s 
website indicated on the website that former Louisiana Governor 
Murphy J. Foster, Jr., was a partner in BSW and a member of the firm’s 
government relations practice.100  Actually, Foster had no affiliation with 
BSW and was not licensed to practice in Louisiana, making the related 
material on the website deceptive, false, and misleading.101  The 
                                                          
 95.  New Jersey and New York impose supervisory obligations on law firms, not just partners, 
and thus a large law firm in those states might be disciplined for a Rule 5.3(a) violation even though 
no individual partner is disciplined.  See N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(a) (2004) (stating 
that “every lawyer, law firm or organization authorized by the Court Rules to practice law in this 
jurisdiction shall adopt and maintain reasonable efforts to ensure that the conduct of nonlawyers 
retained or employed by the lawyer, law firm or organization is compatible with the professional 
obligations of the lawyer . . . .”); N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(a) (2009) (“A law firm 
shall ensure that the work of nonlawyers who work for the firm is adequately supervised, as 
appropriate.”).  Law firm discipline, however, is rare.  See Ted Schneyer, On Further Reflection: 
How “Professional Self-Regulation” Should Promote Compliance With Broad Ethical Duties of Law 
Firm Management, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 613 & n.191 (2011) (reporting that since 1997, law firms 
have been publicly disciplined in four New Jersey cases and one New York case, and have been 
privately admonished in two New York cases). 
 96.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 11 cmt. d (2000). 
 97.  See Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Johnson, 976 A.2d 245, 266 (Md. 2009) (rejecting 
lawyer’s defense that he could not be held to have violated Maryland Rule 5.3 in connection with 
employee’s dishonesty because the employee held a supervisory position). 
 98.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 11 cmt. d (2000). 
 99.  About Us, BREAZEALE, SACHSE & WILSON, L.L.P., http://www.bswllp.com/solutions/ 
solutions.asp (last visited Sept. 19, 2012) (providing an overview of the firm). 
 100.  In re Bursavich, 45 So. 3d 1029, 1029 (La. 2010) (per curiam); In re Charlton, 45 So. 3d 
1027, 1027 (La. 2010) (per curiam); In re Foster, 45 So. 3d 1026, 1027 (La. 2010) (per curiam); In 
re Oubre, 45 So. 3d 1028, 1028 (La. 2010) (per curiam); In re Reynaud, 45 So. 3d 1028, 1029 (La. 
2010) (per curiam). 
 101.  In re Bursavich, 45 So. 3d at 1029–30; In re Charlton, 45 So. 3d at 1027; In re Foster, 45 
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Louisiana Supreme Court publicly reprimanded all five lawyers for 
violating Louisiana Rule 5.3.102  The court did not specify a particular 
subdivision of the Rule in explaining the violations. 
D. Direct Supervisory Authority: Contours and Considerations 
While Rule 5.3(a) imposes structural obligations on partners, Rules 
5.3(b) and (c)(2) regulate the conduct of lawyers who have “direct 
supervisory authority” over nonlawyer assistants.103  The Rules apply to 
lawyers with such authority even if the lawyers are themselves 
subordinate to other lawyers in the firm.104  To use an obvious example, 
law firm associates who directly supervise nonlawyer staff must comply 
with Rule 5.3(b) even though the associates are subordinate to the firm’s 
partners.105  In addition, multiple lawyers may have direct supervisory 
authority over a single nonlawyer assistant.  If, for example, a paralegal 
is assisting two lawyers with discovery or in preparing for trial, both 
lawyers must satisfy the Rule 5.3(b) requirements. 
A finding of direct supervisory authority depends on more than the 
lawyer’s position or status in the firm.  For example, a partner who never 
works with a particular nonlawyer assistant does not have direct 
supervisory authority over the assistant notwithstanding the partner’s 
status.106  On the other hand, a lawyer need not be a nonlawyer 
assistant’s day-to-day supervisor for Rules 5.3(b) and (c)(2) to apply.107  
In short, whether a lawyer possesses direct supervisory authority over a 
nonlawyer assistant is a case-specific question of fact.108 
Lawyers may violate Rule 5.3(b) in connection with misconduct by 
nonlawyer assistants they supervise even if they are unaware of the 
                                                                                                                       
So. 3d at 1027; In re Oubre, 45 So. 3d at 1028; In re Reynaud, 45 So. 3d at 1029. 
 102.  In re Bursavich, 45 So. 3d at 1030; In re Charlton, 45 So. 3d at 1028; In re Foster, 45 So. 
3d at 1027; In re Oubre, 45 So. 3d at 1028; In re Reynaud, 45 So. 3d at 1029. 
 103.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(b), (c)(2) (2012).  Rule 5.3(c)(2) also applies to 
lawyers who are partners or who have comparable managerial authority in their law firms.  Id. R. 
5.3(c)(2). 
 104.  2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 22, § 44.7, at 44-6. 
 105.  See S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Adv. Op. 06-05 (2006), 2006 WL 4666947, at *2–3 
(referring to an associate working for a law firm’s sole owner).  
 106.  See id. (discussing potential supervisory responsibilities of a sole owner of a law firm with 
respect to supervision of a bookkeeper by the owner or by an associate).   
 107.  Cf. In re Anonymous Member of the S.C. Bar, 552 S.E.2d 10, 13 (S.C. 2001) (per curiam) 
(discussing lawyers’ duties under South Carolina Rule 5.1(b), which analogously refers to a lawyer 
“having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer”).  
 108.  See id. (discussing direct supervisory authority for South Carolina Rule 5.1 purposes). 
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misconduct.109  For that matter, because Rule 5.3(b) requires a lawyer 
with direct supervisory authority over a nonlawyer assistant to make 
reasonable efforts to ensure that the assistant acts compatibly with the 
lawyer’s professional obligations, the lawyer may be disciplined for 
supervisory shortcomings even if the assistant commits no misconduct.110  
In this way Rule 5.3(b) is similar to Rule 5.3(a)—both impose 
preventive, or prophylactic, duties on lawyers.111 
Under Rule 5.3(b), a lawyer with direct supervisory authority over a 
nonlawyer assistant must make “reasonable efforts to ensure that the 
person’s conduct is compatible with” the lawyer’s professional 
obligations.112  Whether a lawyer’s efforts are reasonable depends on the 
circumstances.  Different practice areas, assignments, or responsibilities 
will almost certainly raise different concerns or levels of concern for 
lawyers, just as assistants’ individual experience and work history will 
influence the supervision required.  Generally, to satisfy the reasonable 
effort requirement, lawyers must appropriately instruct nonlawyer 
assistants on professional responsibility aspects of assignments.113  A 
lawyer’s failure to train an assistant will support a Rule 5.3(b) 
violation.114  Absent evidence that an assistant is contemplating particular 
misconduct, however, a lawyer has no duty to instruct the assistant on 
professional responsibilities that should be obvious to an average 
person.115  Apart from the general requirement that lawyers provide 
                                                          
 109.  See, e.g., People v. Calvert, 280 P.3d 1269, 1283 (Colo. 2012) (explaining that lawyer 
could have learned of paralegal’s misconduct through “[b]asic oversight and simple diligence,” but 
even if he had “no inkling” of the paralegal’s misconduct, he still would have violated Rule 5.3(b) 
by inadequately supervising her work); In re Wilkinson, 805 So. 2d 142, 144–47 (La. 2002) (per 
curiam) (suspending lawyer for violating Louisiana Rule 5.3(b) where law clerk never told lawyer of 
relevant events and lawyer was otherwise unaware of them). 
 110.  See ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 7, § 5.3-1, at 1005 (using breach of 
confidentiality as an example). 
 111.  Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(a) (2012) (stating that “a partner, and 
a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority 
in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving 
reasonable assurance that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the 
lawyer” (emphasis added)), with id. R. 5.3(b) (providing that “a lawyer having direct supervisory 
authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is 
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer” (emphasis added)). 
 112.  Id. R. 5.3(b). 
 113.  In re Comish, 889 So. 2d 236, 245 (La. 2004) (per curiam). 
 114.  In re Kellogg, 4 P.3d 594, 602 (Kan. 2000) (per curiam). 
 115.  See, e.g., Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Pinciaro, No. CV 970396643S, 1997 WL 155379, 
at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 21, 1997) (dismissing alleged Connecticut Rule 5.3(b) violation where 
to rule otherwise would have required the lawyer to advise the assistant at the time of hiring that it is 
improper to accept kickbacks from clients unless the lawyer was on notice that the assistant was 
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nonlawyer assistants appropriate training or instruction, it is impossible 
to specify what further measures the lawyer needs to take without 
knowing the facts of the particular case.  The essential guideline for 
lawyers is, as the language of the rule indicates, reasonableness.116  As 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals cogently observed: 
Responsible supervision does not mean that the lawyer must duplicate 
the employee’s work or scrutinize and regulate it so closely that the 
economic and other advantages of the delegation are lost.  Rule 5.3(b) 
requires “reasonable efforts,” not overkill.  Reasonable controls and 
review need not be overly intricate or unduly burdensome.117 
For a lawyer with direct supervisory authority over a nonlawyer 
assistant to violate Rule 5.3(b), the lawyer must somehow fail as a 
supervisor; there is no violation if the lawyer reasonably attempts to 
ensure that the assistant’s conduct comports with the lawyer’s 
professional obligations but the assistant nonetheless crosses a line.118  
Supervisory lawyers are not guarantors of their assistants’ conduct.  
Lawyers, however, may not defend against alleged Rule 5.3(b) or (c)(2) 
violations on the basis that they were too busy to fulfill their related 
responsibilities, or that any failure was mere negligence.119 
As discussed in connection with Rule 5.3(a), partners in leadership 
roles must embrace their supervisory obligations.120  A Delaware case, In 
re Bailey,121 indicates that law firm leaders’ or managers’ conduct may 
be subject to heightened scrutiny in evaluating the reasonableness of 
their supervisory efforts under Rule 5.3(b)—at least where client or firm 
funds are concerned.122 
                                                                                                                       
contemplating such misconduct).   
 116.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(b) (2012) (referring to “reasonable efforts” 
by supervisory lawyers); id. R. 5.3(c)(2) (requiring “reasonable remedial action” by partners and 
supervisory lawyers in certain circumstances). 
 117.  In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1, 16 (D.C. 2005). 
 118.  See, e.g., People v. Peters, 82 P.3d 389, 394–95 (Colo. 2003) (rejecting alleged Colorado 
Rule 5.3(b) violation where lawyer reasonably instructed and supervised process server who, it 
turned out, had not always effected service as represented and required); In re Tos, 576 A.2d 607, 
614 (Del. 1990) (per curiam) (rejecting alleged Delaware Rule 5.3(b) violation where lawyer 
appropriately instructed law clerk who allegedly failed to obey those instructions).  
 119.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 11 cmt. f (2000).  
 120.  See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text (using Louisiana cases to illustrate the 
point). 
 121.  821 A.2d 851 (Del. 2003) (per curiam). 
 122.  Id. at 864–65.  For more on the professional responsibilities of law firm leaders and 
managers, see  Douglas R. Richmond, Law Firm Management & Professional Responsibility, 9 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 187 (2003).  
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James Bailey was the managing partner of Bailey & Wetzel, which 
“had two partners, several associates, and about a dozen employees.”123  
As managing partner, Bailey had responsibility for the firm’s accounting 
practices and tax compliance.124  Audits by the Delaware Lawyers’ Fund 
for Client Protection (the Fund) revealed serious deficiencies in Bailey & 
Wetzel’s accounting, tax reporting, and payment practices.125  The Fund 
attributed the problems to the incompetence or dishonesty of Bailey & 
Wetzel’s former bookkeeper and to a lazy outside accountant who was 
embedded in Bailey & Wetzel in a stalled effort to reconcile the firm’s 
books.126  Delaware authorities charged Bailey with violating several 
ethics rules, including the state equivalent of Rule 5.3(b).127  Bailey 
admitted that he violated Rule 5.3 
by failing to have reasonable safeguards in place to ensure an accurate 
accounting of his financial books and records . . . , by failing to 
supervise his employees’ conduct in reconciling his books and records 
and filing and paying payroll taxes, and by knowing that [the law 
firm’s] taxes were not being timely filed and paid.128 
A disciplinary board recommended that Bailey be suspended from 
practice for six months and one day, which he appealed to the Delaware 
Supreme Court.129 
One of the issues on appeal was whether Bailey was guilty of 
knowing misconduct in connection with his stipulated failure to ensure 
his firm’s accounting staff’s compliance with the Rule 1.15 requirements 
for safeguarding clients’ property.130  The court agreed with the Fund’s 
assertion that a managing partner’s “sustained and systematic failure” to 
supervise employees to ensure compliance with his duties under Rule 
1.15 could not be characterized as mere negligence.131  As the court 
explained, a lawyer who accepts responsibility for a firm’s 
administration “stands in a position of trust vis-à-vis other lawyers and 
employees.”132  Managing partners must discharge their obligations 
                                                          
 123.  In re Bailey, 821 A.2d at 857. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. at 854–55. 
 126.  Id. at 856–60. 
 127.  Id. at 856 & n.7. 
 128.  Id. at 856 n.7. 
 129.  Id. at 862. 
 130.  Id. at 863–65. 
 131.  Id. at 864 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 132.  Id. at 864–65. 
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“faithfully and diligently.”133  “Although a managing partner cannot 
guarantee, absolutely, the integrity of the firm’s books and records,” she 
must “implement reasonable safeguards to ensure that the firm is meeting 
its obligations with respect to its books and records.”134  Meeting this 
requirement need not pose a substantial burden; common sense 
measures, such as hiring outside auditors and requiring two signatures on 
law firm checks, will often suffice.135  The responsibility that managing 
partners must shoulder, however, is a serious one.136 
As for Bailey, he had “knowingly failed to exercise even a modicum 
of diligence” in supervising his firm’s accounting practices, and his 
“indifference and inattention” persisted until the Fund conducted its 
audits.137  His knowing and sustained disregard of his duties as managing 
partner created the potential for serious harm to clients and colleagues.138  
Even though Bailey’s misconduct actually caused no serious harm, the 
court suspended him from practice for six months and one day as a 
sanction.139 
E. Rule 5.3 Does Not Create Vicarious Liability for Lawyers 
Perhaps the greatest concern about Rule 5.3 voiced by practicing 
lawyers, and a persistent misconception about the rule in general, is that 
it imposes vicarious liability.  Rule 5.3 does no such thing.140  Lawyers’ 
supervisory liability under Rule 5.3 is not vicarious.141  Vicarious 
                                                          
 133.  Id. at 865 (footnote omitted). 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. at 865 & n.33. 
 136.  Id. at 865. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 866–67. 
 139.  Id. at 867. 
 140.  2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 22, § 44.2, at 44-3 (explaining that Rule 5.3 “establishes 
an independent duty of supervision rather than a regime of imputed liability”); RICHMOND ET AL., 
supra note 28, at 168–69 (asserting that lawyers “clearly are not” vicariously liable for nonlawyer 
assistants’ actions under Rule 5.3). 
 141. In re Phillips, 244 P.3d 549, 553 (Ariz. 2010); see also People v. Peters, 82 P.3d 389, 394–
95 (Colo. 2003) (rejecting alleged Colorado Rule 5.3(b) violation where lawyer reasonably 
instructed and supervised process server who submitted false information on service sheets); Iowa 
Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Dunahoo, 799 N.W.2d 524, 534 (Iowa 2011) (finding no Iowa 
Rule 5.3(b) violation where assistant’s mistake “was not a direct consequence of inattentive 
instruction or supervision by [the lawyer]”); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Ficker, 706 A.2d 
1045, 1050 (Md. 1998) (finding no Maryland Rule 5.3 violation where lawyer’s assistant failed to 
timely relay telephone message to lawyer even though failure  ultimately led to the issuance of a 
bench warrant against the lawyer’s client); In re Galasso, __N.E.2d__, 2012 WL 5199400 (N.Y. Oct. 
23, 2012) (“To be clear, respondent is not being held responsible for the criminal behavior of his 
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liability is liability imposed on a party for the conduct of another “based 
solely on a relationship between” them.142  Applying the doctrine of 
respondeat superior, which imposes, or produces, vicarious liability,143 a 
principal is liable for harm occasioned by her agent’s conduct in the 
course and scope of the agency relationship, even though the principal 
herself did nothing to harm the plaintiff.144  In stark contrast, applying 
Rule 5.3, a lawyer is not subject to discipline merely because a 
nonlawyer assistant errs or commits some type of misconduct in the 
course and scope of her work for the lawyer.145  Because the lawyer’s 
mere relationship to the assistant furnishes no basis for discipline if the 
assistant acts incompatibly with the lawyer’s professional duties, the 
lawyer’s liability under Rule 5.3 is not vicarious.  Rather than enforcing 
a vicarious liability regime, Rule 5.3 clearly imposes an independent 
duty of supervision.146  To violate Rule 5.3, a lawyer must somehow fail 
as a supervisor.147 
It is also possible to illustrate that Rule 5.3 does not create vicarious 
liability by reverse engineering respondeat superior principles.  In a 
nutshell, vicarious liability “is derivative and depends upon the liability 
of the negligent agent to the injured plaintiff.”148  If a plaintiff cannot sue 
the agent, the plaintiff also cannot sue the principal for vicarious 
liability.149  Now, someone allegedly harmed by a nonlawyer assistant’s 
                                                                                                                       
brother.  Rather, it is his own breach of his fiduciary duty and failure to properly supervise his 
employee, resulting in the loss of client funds entrusted to him, that warrant this disciplinary 
action.”).   
 142.  Sutherland v. Barton, 570 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 1997) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1566 (6th ed. 1990)); Affordable Power, L.P. v. Buckeye Ventures, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 825, 833 (Tex. 
App. 2011).  
 143.  See Warner v. Sw. Desert Images, LLC, 180 P.3d 986, 994 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (stating 
that “[r]espondeat superior liability is vicarious liability”); Macaluso v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 
59 So. 3d 454, 459 (La. Ct. App. 2011) (equating vicarious liability with the respondeat superior 
doctrine).  
 144.  Sperl v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 946 N.E.2d 463, 470 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011); Fung v. 
Fischer, 365 S.W.3d 507, 522 (Tex. App. 2012). 
 145.  See, e.g., Peters, 82 P.3d at 394–95 (rejecting alleged Colorado Rule 5.3(b) violation where 
lawyer reasonably instructed and supervised process server who submitted false information on 
service sheets); Dunahoo, 799 N.W.2d at 534 (finding no Iowa Rule 5.3(b) violation where 
assistant’s mistake “was not a direct consequence of inattentive instruction or supervision by [the 
lawyer]”); Ficker, 706 A.2d at 1050 (finding no Maryland Rule 5.3 violation where lawyer’s 
assistant failed to timely relay telephone message to lawyer). 
 146.  In re Phillips, 244 P.3d at 553 (quoting In re Galbasini, 786 P.2d 971, 975 (Ariz. 1990)). 
 147.  Id. at 553–54; see also In re Disciplinary Action Against Kaszynski, 620 N.W.2d 708, 712 
(Minn. 2001) (finding a failure to supervise). 
 148.  Morales-Cruz v. Pac. Coast Container, Inc., No. 65820–4–I, 2011 WL 3568897, at *6 
(Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2011).  
 149.  Id. 
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misconduct cannot obtain relief by reporting the assistant to disciplinary 
authorities; such assistants are not subject to professional discipline.150  
Because the assistant is immune to discipline for her alleged misconduct, 
it is impossible for the lawyer for whom the assistant works to be 
vicariously liable for violating Rule 5.3.  Applying the respondeat 
superior doctrine, there is no basis for deriving the lawyer’s disciplinary 
responsibility.  As a result, the lawyer can be disciplined, if at all, only 
for some supervisory breach.  That is a separate theory of 
responsibility.151  Although vicarious liability may work in tort, it is no 
basis for imposing professional discipline in any jurisdiction that has 
adopted Rule 5.3.152 
Nonetheless, the mistaken notion that Rule 5.3 makes lawyers 
vicariously liable for nonlawyer assistants’ misconduct persists, as State 
ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Martin153 illustrates.  The lawyer there, 
Jeffrey Martin, found himself in hot water because of his relationship 
with a nonlawyer named Mark Wingo, whom he met when Wingo 
approached Martin about a job.154  Wingo was on federal probation for 
white collar crimes and needed a job to satisfy the requirements of his 
probation.155  When he called on Martin, Wingo was operating a “legal 
support services” business in the same building as Martin, in which he 
supposedly did photocopying, Bates-numbering, and miscellaneous 
paralegal work.156  Martin agreed to put Wingo on his firm’s payroll, and 
Wingo agreed to call his business the Jeff Martin Research Center.157  
Wingo was to run the Center and bear any losses; Martin would be 
compensated by receiving a percentage of the Center’s income.158 
Martin performed no pre-employment background check on Wingo, 
nor did he ever attempt to learn what services Wingo was actually 
providing to anyone in his business.159  Martin never had any direct 
                                                          
 150.  Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Wills, 705 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Md. 1998). 
 151.  Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03(2) (2006) (outlining principal’s 
vicarious liability for agent’s conduct), with id. § 7.05(1) (governing principal’s liability for 
negligent supervision of agent).   
 152.  See generally 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 22, § 44.2, at 44-3 (explaining that Rule 5.3 
“establishes an independent duty of supervision rather than a regime of imputed liability”). 
 153.  240 P.3d 690 (Okla. 2010). 
 154.  Id. at 696. 
 155.  Id.  
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. 
RICHMOND FINAL COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/28/2012  1:02 PM 
464 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
contact with Wingo’s operations.160  When he received funds from 
Wingo, Martin simply assumed that they had been earned through the 
Center.161  In fact, Wingo was practicing law without a license.162  The 
Westcotts, a couple who were deceived by Wingo in connection with 
their son’s purported representation, complained about Martin to the 
Oklahoma Bar Association.163  A professional responsibility tribunal 
found that Martin had violated several Oklahoma Rules of Professional 
Conduct, including Oklahoma Rule 5.3, and recommended his 
suspension from practice for six months.164  Martin’s case then 
proceeded to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 
The court in Martin began its analysis by observing that lawyers are 
duty-bound to supervise the work done by their lay assistants and 
ultimately are responsible for all work done by their staffs.165  Lawyers 
who fail to properly supervise nonlawyer assistants are “guilty of 
dereliction of duty.”166  In this case, Martin’s “utter failure” to supervise 
Wingo allowed Wingo to engage in the unauthorized practice of law.167 
After that introduction, the court attempted to explain Martin’s 
violation of Rule 5.3 in greater detail.  In doing so, it quickly spun a 
vicarious liability web: 
The vicarious responsibility of a lawyer . . . subjects [him] both to 
private-law (civil) liability as well as to the Bar’s disciplinary process 
of public law.  Today’s opinion deals exclusively with the respondent’s 
breach of his public-law duty as a member of the Bar.  A disciplinary 
dereliction that comes under the rubric of a lawyer’s breach of 
vicarious professional responsibility may not be treated as less serious 
than one of the same nature which was brought to enforce a 
practitioner’s personal disciplinary responsibility by his own act or 
omission.  Both breaches must be dealt with as being of equal 
seriousness.  The discipline to be imposed for these derelictions should 
not vary one iota if the facts are identical.  We must hence look at the 
respondent’s breach in the same light as we would if this case were 
here to enforce his own disciplinary offense rather than his vicarious 
responsibility for breach by a third party acting as respondent’s agent.  
                                                          
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. at 697–98. 
 163.  Id. at 697. 
 164.  Id. at 694–95. 
 165.  Id. at 697. 
 166.  Id. at 698 (citing OKLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3). 
 167.  Id. 
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In short, although the respondent was not the actor, the act in suit is 
imputed in law to his own doing.168 
Next, the court foreclosed any future argument that lawyers in 
Martin’s situation might escape discipline through defenses based on 
their firms’ organizational forms.  The court adhered to its vicarious 
liability approach in the process: 
Simply and concisely stated, a lawyer’s vicarious public-law liability, 
in the context of a disciplinary bar proceeding, means that all licensed 
lawyers are fully and absolutely accountable for all breaches of 
professional ethics committed not only by fellow lawyers in the law 
firm, but also by those persons who are unlicensed or lay employees of 
a lawyer or of an association of lawyers in a single firm, regardless of 
the firm’s name or of its precise legal entity.169 
Martin fell “woefully short” in supervising Wingo and ensuring that 
Wingo’s conduct was compatible with Martin’s obligations as a 
lawyer.170  Martin’s dereliction of his professional duties enabled Wingo 
to practice law without a license and, in the process, harm the 
Westcotts.171  The fact that Wingo also may have victimized Martin did 
not reduce Martin’s culpability.172  Martin was “vicariously liable in 
disciplinary responsibility” for all of Wingo’s misdeeds, which went 
unnoticed until the Westcotts complained.173  In the end, the court settled 
on a public reprimand as Martin’s discipline.174 
Although Martin certainly deserved discipline for allowing Wingo to 
run amok, the decision in Martin is otherwise deeply flawed; the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court mangled the Rule 5.3 analysis.  In mistakenly 
holding lawyers vicariously liable for their lay assistants’ misconduct, 
the court overlooked both case law175 and respected scholarly authority176 
instructing that Rule 5.3 does nothing of the sort.  The court also missed 
the obvious analogy to Rule 5.1, which employs nearly identical 
                                                          
 168.  Id. at 698–99 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
 169.  Id. at 699 (emphasis omitted). 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  Id. at 702. 
 175.  In re Galbasini, 786 P.2d 971, 975 (Ariz. 1990) (“Although [Rule] 5.3 may not establish a 
rule of vicarious or imputed liability, it does mandate an independent duty of supervision.”).   
 176.  2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 22, § 44.2, at 44-3 (stating that Rule 5.3 “establishes an 
independent duty of supervision rather than a regime of imputed liability”). 
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language in establishing lawyers’ supervisory responsibility for other 
lawyers, and which other courts had held did not create vicarious 
liability.177  Moreover, the court did not need to rely on vicarious liability 
to discipline Martin or, more fundamentally, to causally link Wingo’s 
misconduct to Martin.  But for Martin’s inexplicable abdication of his 
supervisory obligations, Wingo could not have victimized the Westcotts 
as he did—a point the court recognized.178  In other words, the Martin 
court’s misguided detour into vicarious liability was completely 
unnecessary. 
To summarize, Model Rule 5.3 and equivalent state rules of 
professional conduct do not make lawyers guarantors of nonlawyer 
assistants’ conduct.179  Rule 5.3 does not create vicarious liability for 
lawyers.180  Vicarious liability flows from the mere relationship between 
the alleged wrongdoer and the defendant.181  In contrast, Model Rule 5.3 
and state analogs impose an independent duty of supervision on 
lawyers.182  In this respect, Martin was wrongly decided and other courts 
should not follow it. 
III. RULE 8.4(a) 
It is impossible to discuss Rule 5.3 without also giving a nod to Rule 
8.4(a), given that cases in which lawyers are held to violate Rule 5.3 
frequently generate Rule 8.4(a) violations as well.183  Rule 8.4(a) 
provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “violate or 
attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or 
                                                          
 177.  In re Anonymous Member of the S.C. Bar, 552 S.E.2d 10, 14 (S.C. 2001) (per curiam); 
Stewart v. Coffman, 748 P.2d 579, 581–82 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
 178.  Martin, 240 P.3d at 699.  
 179.  In re Phillips, 244 P.3d 549, 553 (Ariz. 2010) (quoting In re Miller, 872 P.2d 661, 663 
(Ariz. 1994)). 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Sutherland v. Barton, 570 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 1997) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1566 (6th ed. 1990)); Affordable Power, L.P. v. Buckeye Ventures, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 825, 833 (Tex. 
App. 2011); 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 5:8, at 663 (2009 
ed.).  
 182.  In re Phillips, 244 P.3d at 553 (quoting In re Galbasini, 786 P.2d 971, 975 (Ariz. 1990)). 
 183.  See, e.g., In re Williams, 52 So. 3d 864, 870 (La. 2011) (per curiam) (reciting disciplinary 
board’s finding that by violating Louisiana Rule 5.3(b), among other rules, lawyer also violated Rule 
8.4(a)); In re Geiger, 27 So. 3d 280, 285 (La. 2010) (per curiam) (concluding that lawyer who 
violated Louisiana Rules 5.3(a) and (b) also violated Rule 8.4(a)); Martin, 240 P.3d at 698 (noting 
that a lawyer who violated Oklahoma Rule 5.3 also violated Rule 8.4(a)); In re Woods, 702 S.E.2d 
562, 564 (S.C. 2010) (per curiam) (reprimanding lawyer who, by violating South Carolina Rule 5.3, 
among other rules, also violated Rule 8.4(a)).  
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induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another.”184  The 
second and third forms of conduct prohibited in Rule 8.4(a) have obvious 
implications for lawyers’ use of nonlawyer assistants.  Lawyers cannot 
instruct agents to do for them that which they cannot ethically do 
themselves.185  For example, lawyers cannot direct lay assistants to 
communicate ex parte with represented parties in circumstances where 
the lawyers are prohibited from doing so under Rule 4.2,186 or use a 
nonlawyer to solicit clients when Rule 7.3 would prevent the lawyer 
from doing so herself.187  By way of further example, a lawyer cannot 
instruct or permit a nonlawyer assistant to make misrepresentations or to 
engage in deceitful or misleading conduct that the lawyer would be 
prohibited from making or engaging in under Rule 8.4(c).188 
A lawyer may violate Rule 8.4(a) merely by attempting to violate 
another rule of professional conduct.189  The paradigmatic example of 
this principle is a case in which a lawyer plans or tries to do something 
that would violate a rule of professional conduct but is prevented from 
doing so or is frustrated in her effort.190  For a lawyer to be disciplined 
                                                          
 184.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (2012). 
 185.  See id. R. 8.4 cmt. 1 (“Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to 
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so or do so 
through the acts of another, as when they . . . instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer’s behalf.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 186.  See, e.g., In re Pyle, 91 P.3d 1222, 1228–29 (Kan. 2004) (per curiam) (concluding that 
lawyer violated Kansas Rule 4.2 by having client deliver an affidavit to represented opposing party 
and that Kansas Rule 8.4(a) was embedded in Kansas Rule 4.2 in this instance); Bratcher v. Ky. Bar 
Ass’n, 290 S.W.3d 648, 648–50 (Ky. 2009) (reprimanding lawyer who, in representing a plaintiff in 
a wrongful discharge suit, hired a company to call the defendant while posing as prospective 
employer checking the plaintiff’s references).  
 187.  See, e.g., Miss. Bar v. Turnage, 919 So. 2d 36, 44 (Miss. 2005) (concluding that lawyer’s 
use of former insurance agent to solicit clients violated Mississippi Rules 7.3 and 8.4(a)); In re 
Pajerowski, 721 A.2d 992, 995 (N.J. 1998) (per curiam) (concluding that lawyer’s use of “runners” 
to solicit clients violated New Jersey Rules 5.3, 7.3, and 8.4(a) among other rules). 
 188.  See, e.g., People v. Cozier, 74 P.3d 531, 536 (Colo. 2003) (concluding that lawyer who 
instructed notary to notarize a signature she had not witnessed and who then published the document 
to probate court violated Colorado Rules 8.4(a) and (c)).  Rule 8.4(c) provides that it is professional 
misconduct for lawyers to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2012).   
 189.  See, e.g., In re Fink, 22 A.3d 461, 469–71 (Vt. 2011) (agreeing with a professional 
responsibility board panel that a lawyer violated Vermont Rule 8.4(a) by attempting to charge an 
unreasonable contingent fee in violation of Vermont Rule 1.5(a)).  But see Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y 
Disciplinary Bd. v. Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 761, 769 (Iowa 2010) (stating that the purpose of Iowa 
Rule 8.4(a) is to notify lawyers that they are subject to discipline for violating rules of professional 
conduct, not to create a separate violation).  
 190.  See, e.g., People v. Katz, 58 P.3d 1176, 1192 (Colo. 2002) (discussing a lawyer’s attempt 
to convert funds and stating that “[t]he fortuitous discovery and frustration of [the lawyer’s] intended 
misappropriation . . . does not lessen the seriousness of his actions.  Through his conduct, [the 
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for knowingly assisting or inducing another person to violate a rule of 
professional conduct, or for a lawyer to violate an ethics rule through the 
acts of another, however, there must be an underlying rule violation.191  
In these latter two contexts, there can be no independent Rule 8.4(a) 
violation; the lawyer must violate some other rule of professional 
conduct.192 
IV. LAWYERS’ COMMON LAW DUTY OF SUPERVISION AND 
RESTATEMENT SECTION 11 
In addition to evaluation under Rule 5.3, lawyers’ supervisory 
responsibilities for nonlawyer assistants may expose them to potential 
civil liability to clients and others.  For that matter, the prospect of tort 
liability is “practically of greater importance” to most lawyers than the 
threat of professional discipline.193  This leads us to the principles set 
forth in the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, which 
“draws heavily” on case law in framing lawyers’ civil liability.194  
Section 11 of the Restatement combines Rules 5.1 and 5.3, closely 
paraphrasing them in the process.  With respect to lawyers’ supervision 
of nonlawyer assistants, section 11 provides: 
(4) With respect to a nonlawyer employee of a law firm, the lawyer is 
subject to professional discipline if either: 
(a) the lawyer fails to make reasonable efforts to ensure: 
(i) that the firm in which the lawyer practices has in effect measures 
giving reasonable assurance that the nonlawyer’s conduct is compatible 
with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and 
(ii) that conduct of a nonlawyer over whom the lawyer has direct 
supervisory authority is compatible with the professional obligations of 
the lawyer; or 
                                                                                                                       
lawyer] attempted to knowingly convert funds of another in violation of [Colorado Rule 8.4(a)].”); 
Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Duty, 671 S.E.2d 763, 770 (W. Va. 2008) (per curiam) (finding that 
lawyer who wrongfully but unsuccessfully attempted to withhold $3,500 in expenses from 
settlement proceeds violated West Virginia Rules 8.4(a) and (c)). 
 191.  See, e.g., Long v. Ethics & Discipline Comm. of the Utah Sup. Ct., 256 P.3d 206, 219–20 
& n.55 (Utah 2011) (finding that because lawyer did not violate Utah Rule 5.3(a) or 5.5(a), he could 
not have violated Rule 8.4(a)).  
 192.  Id. at 220 n.55. 
 193.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, Foreword, at XXI (2000). 
 194.  Id.  
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(b) the nonlawyer’s conduct would be a violation of the applicable 
lawyer code if engaged in by a lawyer, and 
(i) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies 
the conduct; or 
(ii) the lawyer is a partner or principal in the law firm, or has direct 
supervisory authority over the nonlawyer, and knows of the conduct at 
a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to 
take reasonable remedial measures.195 
Having been led this far, however, it is not easy to tie section 11 to 
principles of civil liability.  Section 11 refers to the remedy of 
professional discipline and, indeed, courts have so employed it.196  
Nothing in the text of the section suggests that it describes lawyers’ 
potential civil liability for failing to supervise nonlawyer assistants.  That 
said, three things are surely true.  First, the Restatement as a whole is 
focused on lawyers’ civil liability.197  Second, the comments to section 
11 are littered with references to lawyers’ civil liability.198  Third, if the 
reporters for the Restatement intended solely to clarify “the intendment” 
of Rule 5.3 or to supersede mistakes in the drafting of Rule 5.3,199 it is 
unlikely that section 11 would so closely resemble Rule 5.3.  It is 
therefore reasonable to conclude that section 11 has two applications: 
professional discipline and civil liability.  In this way, section 11 is 
distinct from Rule 5.3, which is clearly focused on professional 
discipline.200 
                                                          
 195.  Id. § 11. 
 196.  See, e.g., Mahoning Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Lavelle, 836 N.E.2d 1214, 1217–18 (Ohio 2005) 
(invoking section 11 in disciplining lawyer for supervisory failures).  
 197.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, Foreword, at XXI (2000). 
 198.  Id. § 11 cmt. a (referring to lawyers’ vicarious civil liability for harms caused by other 
lawyers, stating that a lawyer is not vicariously liable for the acts of another lawyer in a firm 
organized as a limited liability enterprise, and stating that a lawyer’s failure to supervise may violate 
a lawyer’s duty of care to a client); id. cmt. f (referring to lawyers’ vicarious liability for the acts of 
nonlawyers and citing to section 58).   
 199.  See id. at XXII (“In many instances . . . the Restatement significantly departs from the code 
formulations. . . . [M]any of these departures simply clarify the intendment of the code provisions 
and others seek to supersede drafting mistakes.”).   
 200.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, Scope [19] (2012) (“Failure to comply with an 
obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process.”).  
Although the Model Rules and state equivalents are focused on professional discipline, in many 
jurisdictions they may be used to establish the standard of care in civil litigation against lawyers.  
Douglas R. Richmond, Why Legal Ethics Rules Are Relevant to Lawyer Liability, 38 ST. MARY’S 
L.J. 929, 939, 946–60 (2007).  
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It is first noteworthy that from a structural standpoint, section 
11(4)(A)(i) is broader than Rule 5.3(a) because section 11(4)(A)(i) 
provides that all lawyers in a firm must attempt to ensure that the firm 
has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that nonlawyers’ 
conduct is compatible with lawyers’ professional obligations, while Rule 
5.3(a) imposes this duty only on partners and other lawyers with 
comparable managerial authority.201  In further contrast to Rule 5.3, but 
consistent with tort and agency law principles, the obligations expressed 
in section 11 may be understood to permit lawyers’ vicarious liability for 
nonlawyer assistants’ errors.202  This conclusion flows from reading 
section 11 together with section 58, the latter recognizing that law firms 
and lawyers may be vicariously liable for the wrongful acts or omissions 
of employees acting in the ordinary course and scope of the lawyer’s or 
firm’s business, or with actual or apparent authority.203  As the language 
makes clear, however, section 11 also reflects the common law position 
that lawyers owe supervisory duties regarding nonlawyer assistants, for 
which they may be directly liable should they breach them.204 
Of course, courts in civil cases may hold lawyers vicariously liable 
for lay assistants’ misconduct or decide negligent supervision cases 
against lawyers without mentioning or relying on section 11.  It is 
therefore important to understand lawyers’ potential supervisory liability 
in broader context. 
A defendant’s vicarious liability premised on respondeat superior 
and liability for negligent supervision represent separate theories of 
recovery.205  Plaintiffs may allege both causes of action in the same 
                                                          
 201.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 11 cmt. f (2000). 
 202.  See id. (referring to section 58, which is entitled “Vicarious Liability”). 
 203.  Id. § 58. 
 204.  See, e.g., David C. Joel, Att’y at Law, P.C. v. Chastain, 562 S.E.2d 746, 750 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2002) (discussing lawyer’s liability to client based on lawyer’s supervisory failure with respect to a 
nonlawyer “case negotiator”).   
 205.  Beach v. Budd, No. A10–1471, 2011 WL 1642579, at *8 n.7 (Minn. Ct. App. May 3, 
2011); Tessier v. Rockefeller, 33 A.3d 1118, 1133 (N.H. 2011) (quoting Exeter Hosp. v. N.H. Ins. 
Guar. Ass’n, 965 A.2d 1159, 1163–64 (N.H. 2009)).  Under respondeat superior, a plaintiff is not 
required to establish any breach of duty by the employer, while a negligent supervision claim 
requires the plaintiff to prove the employer’s negligence proximately caused her injuries.  Vancura v. 
Katris, 939 N.E.2d 328, 343 (Ill. 2010).  In some states, liability for negligent supervision may—or 
even must—be premised on employee misconduct occurring outside the scope of employment.  See, 
e.g., Dawkins v. City of Honolulu, 761 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1093 (D. Haw. 2010) (applying Hawaii 
law); LaPlant v. Snohomish Cnty., No. 64281–2–I, 2011 WL 1744441, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. May 
9, 2011) (“[A] cause of action for negligent supervision requires a plaintiff to show that an employee 
acted outside the scope of his or her employment. But when an employee commits negligence within 
the scope of employment, a different theory of liability—vicarious liability—applies.” (footnotes 
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case.206  Although not required for vicarious liability, plaintiffs must 
support negligent supervision claims against lawyers with expert 
testimony concerning the standard of care.207 
When the concern is whether a lawyer is vicariously liable for an 
employee’s alleged error, the questions are generally straightforward.  
For example, did the employee’s misconduct occur in the course and 
scope of her employment?208  A lawyer’s potential liability becomes 
harder to evaluate where the alleged wrongdoer is not the lawyer’s 
employee, but instead is an independent contractor retained by or 
associated with the lawyer.  Kleeman v. Rheingold209 is the leading case 
on this point. 
Janet Kleeman retained Paul Rheingold to represent her in a medical 
malpractice case against Dr. Neils Lauersen.210  Rheingold sent the suit 
papers to Fischer’s Service Bureau, the process service agency his firm 
regularly used, to serve Dr. Lauersen.211  The process server that 
Fischer’s assigned to the case served Dr. Lauersen improperly, and, as a 
result, Kleeman’s suit was barred by the statute of limitations.212  
Kleeman then sued Rheingold for legal malpractice on three theories: 
first, that Rheingold breached a nondelegable duty owed by all lawyers 
to assure proper service of their clients’ legal process; second, that 
Rheingold was liable for the process server’s error under agency 
principles; and third, that Rheingold was directly liable for negligently 
selecting Fischer’s to serve her suit, for failing to monitor or supervise 
Fischer’s work, and for failing to file the summons and complaint in a 
fashion that would have tolled the statute of limitations.213  Rheingold 
won summary judgment in the trial court and a lower appellate court 
                                                                                                                       
omitted)).  Finally, some states distinguish between negligent supervision, negligent hiring, and 
negligent retention claims.  See, e.g., Wayman v. Accor N. Am., Inc., 251 P.3d 640, 649 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 2011) (quoting Marquis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 P.2d 1213, 1223 (Kan. 1998)), and 
noting the distinct theories of recovery). 
 206.  See, e.g., Selechnik v. Office of Howard R. Birnbach, 920 N.Y.S.2d 128, 131 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2011) (concluding that the plaintiff adequately stated causes of action to recover from law firm 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior and on the theory of negligent hiring and retention).  
 207.  McLister v. Epstein & Lawrence, P.C., 934 P.2d 844, 847 (Colo. App. 1996). 
 208.  See, e.g., Moser v. Davis, 79 S.W.3d 162, 170 (Tex. App. 2002) (holding that lawyer was 
not liable for legal secretary’s actions where secretary was acting outside the scope of her 
employment).  
 209.  614 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1993). 
 210.  Id. at 713–14. 
 211.  Id. at 714. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. 
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affirmed the trial court judgment.214  Kleeman then appealed to the New 
York Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court. 
In rejecting Kleeman’s claims, both the trial court and the lower 
appellate court had concluded that a process server is an independent 
contractor rather than an attorney’s agent, and, as such, Rheingold could 
not be vicariously liable for Fischer’s failure to properly serve Kleeman’s 
suit.215  The Court of Appeals disagreed, deciding that lawyers owe 
clients a nondelegable duty to accomplish service of process and cannot 
escape liability for breaching that duty by delegating the task to 
independent contractors.216 
The Kleeman court reasoned that the duty owed by lawyers to their 
clients to exercise care in serving process fit “squarely and neatly within 
the category of obligations that the law regards as ‘non-delegable,’” and 
thus qualified as an exception to the general rule that one who retains an 
independent contractor is not liable for the independent contractor’s 
negligence.217  As the court explained: 
Manifestly, when an individual retains an attorney to commence an 
action, timely and accurate service of process is an integral part of the 
task that the attorney undertakes . . . Furthermore, proper service of 
process is a particularly critical component of a lawyer’s over-all 
responsibility for commencing a client’s lawsuit, since a mistake or 
oversight in this area can deprive the client of his or her day in 
court. . . . Given the central importance of this duty . . . attorneys 
cannot be allowed to evade responsibility for its careful performance by 
the simple expedient of “farming out” the task to independent 
contractors.218 
The court buttressed its conclusion with provisions of the New York 
Code of Professional Responsibility that prevented lawyers from 
prospectively limiting liability to clients, forbid lawyers from neglecting 
client matters, enjoined them in protecting and securing their clients’ 
rights, and required them to zealously represent clients within the bounds 
of the law.219  All of these professional responsibility considerations are 
                                                          
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. at 716. 
 218.  Id.  
 219.  Id.  
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triggered when a lawsuit is imperiled by carelessness in serving 
process.220 
The court further explained that its conclusion was supported by 
public perception and the expectations of average clients, who 
reasonably assume that all tasks associated with the initiation of litigation 
will be performed by lawyers or at their direction.221  Although it is 
customary for lawyers to hire independent contractors to serve process, 
the public is not necessarily aware of that practice.222  Even if a client 
knows that her lawyer will use a process server, it is unlikely she will 
realize that the process server’s status as an independent contractor could 
shield the lawyer against liability for the process server’s alleged 
negligence.223  A client’s reasonable beliefs and expectations about who 
will perform a service are important factors in identifying nondelegable 
duties.224 
Finally, the court concluded that permitting lawyers to shift to 
process servers their duty of care would contravene public policy.225  
This policy was grounded in lawyers’ exclusive franchise to practice law, 
which presumes they have the specialized knowledge and character 
required to represent clients competently and diligently.226  Clients must 
be confident that their actions will be commenced in accordance with 
complex procedural requirements and the “formidable body” of related 
case law.227  Because lawyers alone have the experience and knowledge 
necessary to protect clients’ rights in this regard, they must bear not only 
attendant responsibility, but also liability for any associated 
negligence.228 
For these reasons, it was apparent that the lower courts erred in 
awarding summary judgment to Rheingold.229  If the process server’s 
failure to serve properly the defendant in the medical malpractice action 
was the product of negligence, Kleeman was entitled to hold Rheingold 
                                                          
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965); Feliberty v. Damon, 527 
N.E.2d 261 (N.Y. 1988)). 
 225.  Id. 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  Id. at 717. 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  Id. 
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vicariously liable for that failure.230  Because it reversed the judgment in 
favor of Rheingold, the Court of Appeals declined to consider Kleeman’s 
other theories of liability.231 
Kleeman is a narrow decision.  The court confined its recognition of 
a nondelegable duty of care to clients “to the discrete and unique 
function of commencing an action through service of process.”232  That 
nondelegable duty logically extends to the service of subpoenas to secure 
witnesses’ appearance at trials or other key events, but, in other cases, 
independent contractors’ unique status will defeat imputation of liability 
to the lawyers that retained them.233  In the legal malpractice context, 
anyway, nondelegable duties are uncommon.234  In Lawyers Title 
Insurance Corp. v. Groff,235 for example, the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court determined that a lawyer was not vicariously liable for a title 
abstractor’s negligence in performing a title search.236  The Groff court 
reasoned that the lawyer’s alleged duty to examine and clear title “was 
not so essential to the representation as to render it nondelegable.”237  
The court was concerned that a contrary ruling might require lawyers to 
guarantee the results of numerous specialists hired as independent 
contractors, even though they did not agree to assume this 
responsibility.238 
An interesting question that the Kleeman court did not reach was 
whether Rheingold satisfied his duty of care to commence Kleeman’s 
suit properly by retaining a licensed process server.239  In other words, 
was Rheingold negligent in retaining Fischer’s to serve Kleeman’s suit 
papers?  The lower appellate court found that Rheingold satisfied his 
                                                          
 230.  Id. 
 231.  Id. at 718. 
 232.  Id. at 717. 
 233.  See Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Groff, 808 A.2d 44, 47 (N.H. 2002) (discussing lawyers’ 
potential vicarious liability for nonlawyer assistants’ acts, the court observed that “[o]rdinarily, an 
employer is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor”).   
 234.  See, e.g., Cooks v. Rodenbeck, 711 So. 2d 444, 449 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that a 
Louisiana statute imposed a nondelegable duty on lawyers signing pleadings to make an objectively 
reasonable inquiry into the facts and law, thereby satisfying themselves that pleadings are well-
founded); In re Stransky, 612 A.2d 373, 376 (N.J. 1992) (“The attorney’s fiduciary responsibility for 
client trust funds is a non-delegable duty.”).   
 235.  808 A.2d 44 (N.H. 2002). 
 236.  Id. at 46.  
 237.  Id. at 48. 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Kleeman v. Rheingold, 614 N.E.2d 712, 714 (N.Y. 1993). 
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duty by retaining Fischer’s, which held a state license.240  But the mere 
fact that Fischer’s was licensed, while relevant, should not alone be 
sufficient to satisfy Rheingold’s duty of care; the lower court should 
have required something more.241  Was Rheingold’s law firm’s regular 
use of Fischer’s to serve process for the firm’s clients, apparently without 
mishap, that “something more”?  Perhaps it was, though it is difficult to 
answer this question without knowing more facts.242  It is fair to say that 
lawyers generally should attempt to perform reasonable due diligence on 
independent contractors before retaining them.  The amount of diligence 
due will depend on the matter and may be affected by various factors, 
including the client, the lawyer’s familiarity with the contractor, the task 
or project at issue, time constraints, geographic restraints or limitations, 
budgetary or expense concerns, and the availability of alternative service 
providers.  Naturally, a lawyer’s breach of duty does not end the analysis 
of negligent hiring or negligent supervision claims; a plaintiff 
additionally must establish proximate cause and damages to recover 
against the lawyer.243 
V. SPECIAL SUPERVISORY CHALLENGES OR RISKS 
Within the confines of Rule 5.3 and section 11 of the Restatement lie 
four special supervisory challenges or risks for lawyers: (a) the 
employment of family members as nonlawyer assistants, (b) the 
employment of disbarred lawyers as lay assistants, (c) the use of private 
investigators, and (d) outsourcing work to nonlawyers. 
A. Employing Family Members as Nonlawyer Assistants 
Lawyers regularly employ family members as lay assistants, 
although this practice is perhaps more pronounced in smaller law firms.  
Lawyers understandably believe their family members—especially close 
relatives—to be particularly trustworthy.  Sadly, family members 
                                                          
 240.  Id.  
 241.  See Feldman v. Upton, Cohen & Slamowitz, 740 N.Y.S.2d 790, 793 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2002) 
(indicating that licensure would not be dispositive if a licensed process server had a “demonstrated 
record of persistent complaints and established unreliability”). 
 242.  See id. (rejecting negligent hiring claim where lawyers testified that they had “no adverse 
experience” with the errant process server).   
 243.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.05 cmt. c (2006) (stating that liability for 
negligent hiring, supervision, or training “is limited by basic principles of tort law,” and specifically 
mentioning causation).  
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employed as assistants sometimes betray lawyers’ trust, subjecting 
lawyers to potential discipline for allegedly violating Rule 5.3.244 
Consider, for example, a scheme perpetrated against a very good 
boutique litigation firm by the firm’s office manager, who was the 
managing partner’s sister-in-law.245  One of the firm’s clients was a 
company with regular litigation needs.  The firm charged the client a 
$10,000 monthly advance payment retainer to encompass the first fifty 
hours of legal services provided each month.  For monthly hours above 
fifty, the firm charged an hourly rate of $300.  The office manager 
collected the retainer the first day of every month by picking up a 
$10,000 check from the client.  Unfortunately, the office manager was a 
habitual gambler.  To feed her addiction, she forged endorsements on the 
monthly retainer checks and stole the funds.  To disguise the thefts, she 
inflated the client’s monthly bills by thirty-four hours.  The client was 
overbilled by nearly $300,000 before the office manager’s scheme was 
detected.  When the client discovered the fraud and demanded repayment 
from the law firm, the firm sued its bank on various theories related to 
the forged endorsements on its retainer checks and the bank’s alleged 
failure to detect and prevent the office manager’s thefts.  The law firm 
contended that the bank was solely responsible for the client’s loss.  The 
bank defended, in part, by alleging that the managing partner had 
violated his supervisory obligations under Rules 5.3(a) and (b), and that 
the firm thus bore the lion’s share of the fault for the office manager’s 
                                                          
 244.  See, e.g., In re Finestrauss, 32 A.3d 978, 979 (Del. 2011) (per curiam) (reprimanding 
lawyer for failing to supervise his bookkeeper-wife, who failed to pay various payroll tax 
obligations); In re Otlowski, No. 127, 2009, 2009 WL 1796083, at *3 (Del. June 23, 2009) 
(reprimanding lawyer whose daughter stole from his escrow account); In re Shamers, 873 A.2d 
1089, 1094–98 (Del. 2005) (per curiam) (suspending lawyer for protracted failure to supervise his 
bookkeeper-wife); In re Galasso, 940 N.Y.S.2d 88, 91–93 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (per curiam) 
(suspending lawyer whose bookkeeper-brother misappropriated client funds), aff’d as modified, 
__N.E.2d__, 2012 WL 5199400 (N.Y. Oct. 23, 2012) (affirming violation of supervisory 
responsibilities but remanding for reconsideration of suspension as appropriate sanction after 
unrelated disciplinary charge was held to be unfounded); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Hill, 281 
P.3d 1264, 1268, 1272 (Okla. 2012) (finding that lawyer violated Oklahoma Rule 5.3 by failing to 
supervise his office manager-wife, who vindictively misappropriated funds from the lawyer’s 
operating and trust accounts); In re McClain, 719 S.E.2d 675, 675–76 (S.C. 2011) (per curiam) 
(violating South Carolina Rule 5.3 by failing to supervise bookkeeper-wife, who was able to 
embezzle client funds from trust accounts as a result); In re Vanderbeek, 101 P.3d 88, 93–94 (Wash. 
2004) (disciplining lawyer whose bookkeeper-husband “habitually added charges to clients’ bills”; 
lawyer was not initially aware of husband’s fraudulent scheme but “even minimal review of the bills 
or billing process should have revealed it to be happening” (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 245.  Confidentiality obligations prevent me from identifying the law firm. 
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overbilling.246  The firm settled with the bank for a fraction of its claim 
as a result. 
Lawyers must satisfy their supervisory responsibilities even though 
they reasonably consider nonlawyer assistants to be capable and 
trustworthy.247  “Internal controls and supervisory review are essential 
precisely because employee dishonesty and incompetence are not always 
identifiable in advance.”248  Everyone makes mistakes.  Valued 
employees may make misjudgments because of personal stresses or 
setbacks, depression, financial hardships, personality disorders, or 
substance abuse problems.  For whatever reason, some people are simply 
dishonest.  All of these things are as true for lawyers’ relatives as they 
are for the population at large.  A nonlawyer assistant’s familial link to 
the lawyer does not diminish client harm caused by the assistant’s 
misconduct.  Accordingly, lawyers who hire family members as 
assistants cannot ignore their supervisory responsibilities for those 
people based on their relationships with them.249 
B. Employing or Retaining Disbarred Lawyers as Nonlawyer Assistants 
In addition to employing family members as nonlawyer assistants, 
lawyers also hire disbarred lawyers for paralegal and similar positions.  
On the one hand, lawyers’ decisions to hire disbarred lawyers as 
assistants are understandable.  These former lawyers have legal 
knowledge and training, substantive knowledge of various areas of the 
law, and a range of valuable practical experience and skills.250  They may 
have client relationships that are properly transferable to lawyers who 
employ them.  If one believes in the power of remorse and the value of 
redemption, disbarment ought not force a person, who must earn a living 
                                                          
 246.  Lawyers are not excused from supervising nonlawyer assistants by virtue of the existence 
of others who are theoretically positioned to detect misconduct by the assistants.  See, e.g., In re 
Paras, 742 N.E.2d 924, 925–26 (Ind. 2001) (per curiam) (disciplining lawyer in connection with 
secretary’s trust account mismanagement even though some problems with the account were 
attributable to a bank’s error).   
 247.  In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1, 15 (D.C. 2005).  
 248.  Id. at 15–16. 
 249.  See BARBARA GLESNER FINES, ETHICAL ISSUES IN FAMILY REPRESENTATIONS 69 (2010) 
(reminding lawyers to not allow personal relationships with nonlawyer assistants to interfere with 
supervision of those assistants). 
 250.  See David Elkanich et al., Suspended Animation: A lawyer’s Life as a Legal Assistant, OR. 
ST. B. BULL., Jan. 2006, at 27, 27 (observing that suspended lawyers employed as nonlawyer 
assistants “may bring with them a level of experience that can be of real value to the lawyers who 
employ them and their clients”). 
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thereafter, to surrender all of her education and accumulated knowledge.  
On the other hand, courts reserve disbarment for only the gravest 
professional offenses, so banishment from the law is a reasonable 
consequence of such misconduct and is necessary to protect the public 
and the legal profession.  In fact, disbarred lawyers working as lay 
assistants reoffend in their new roles with metronomic regularity—often 
with serious ramifications for the lawyers who hire them.251  
Unauthorized practice of law by disbarred lawyers working as paralegals, 
or in similar capacities, is a serious threat, as such assistants may be 
unable to resist performing tasks they comfortably handled as practicing 
lawyers.252 
A lawyer who is considering hiring a disbarred lawyer as a lay 
assistant should first search the law of the relevant jurisdiction, including 
case law, court rules, ethics opinions, rules of professional conduct, and 
statutes.  Some jurisdictions prohibit lawyers or law firms from 
employing disbarred lawyers as assistants.253  For example, a 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Rule provides that no disbarred or 
suspended lawyer “shall engage in . . . paralegal work, and no lawyer or 
law firm shall knowingly employ or otherwise engage, directly or 
indirectly, in any capacity, a person who is suspended or disbarred by 
any court . . . .”254  “Any capacity” as used in the rule means exactly what 
                                                          
 251.  See, e.g., In re Geary, 640 S.E.2d 253, 254 (Ga. 2007) (per curiam) (suspending a lawyer 
who relied on a disbarred lawyer to sign up a client and to deliver interrogatories to the client); In re 
Scott, 739 N.E.2d 658, 659–60 (Ind. 2000) (per curiam) (suspending a lawyer who, among other 
offenses, failed to supervise a disbarred lawyer who served as his paralegal and office manager; the 
disbarred lawyer engaged in the unauthorized practice of law); In re Juhnke, 41 P.3d 855, 859–61 
(Kan. 2002) (per curiam) (censuring lawyer who allowed disbarred lawyer working as a paralegal to 
engage in the unauthorized practice of law); In re Comish, 889 So. 2d 236, 244–47 (La. 2004) (per 
curiam) (suspending a lawyer who employed a disbarred lawyer as a paralegal; the paralegal 
misappropriated funds and engaged in the unauthorized practice of law); Att’y Grievance Comm’n 
of Md. v. Brennan, 714 A.2d 157, 162–63 (Md. 1998) (suspending lawyer who employed a 
suspended lawyer as a paralegal; the suspended lawyer, while acting as a paralegal, engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law). 
 252.  In re Juhnke, 41 P.3d at 861; see also Pa. Eth. Op. 98-75, supra note 42, at *7 (noting that 
employing disbarred or suspended lawyers as legal assistants can be “problematic” for the 
employing lawyer because “from force of habit [the disbarred lawyer] may continue to act as a 
lawyer”). 
 253.  See, e.g., Miss. State Bar Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 96 (1984) (“It is not proper for an 
attorney to allow a disbarred or suspended attorney to work as a paralegal or legal assistant in the 
attorney’s law office.”); S.C. Bar Ethics Adv. Comm., Adv. Op. 92-20 (1992), 1992 WL 810436 
(prohibiting lawyers from hiring disbarred lawyers “to do legal research and other paralegal work”); 
Wash. State Bar Ass’n Rules of Prof’l Conduct Comm., Adv. Op. 184 (1990) (interpreting 
Washington Rule 5.8(b) as prohibiting a lawyer “from hiring or employing a disbarred lawyer in 
connection with or related to the practice of law”). 
 254.  MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 4:01 § 17(7). 
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it says: a lawyer or law firm cannot employ a suspended or disbarred 
lawyer “even . . . as a secretary, janitor, or messenger.”255  A suspended 
or disbarred Massachusetts lawyer may, however, seek leave to be 
employed as a paralegal after four years in a case of indefinite 
suspension, or after seven years in a case of disbarment.256  Illinois 
Supreme Court Rule 764(b) provides that disbarred lawyers cannot 
“maintain a presence or occupy an office where the practice of law is 
conducted.”257  As written, the Rule suggests that an Illinois lawyer 
might permissibly engage a disbarred lawyer as a lay assistant, so long as 
the person worked away from the lawyer’s office, but the Rule seems to 
be interpreted as flatly prohibiting the use of disbarred lawyers as 
nonlawyer assistants.258 
The majority of jurisdictions, however, permit lawyers to employ 
disbarred lawyers as nonlawyer assistants under certain conditions.259  
Some jurisdictions condition employment or retention of disbarred 
lawyers as nonlawyer assistants through court rules or provisions in their 
rules of professional conduct.260  For example, California Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1-311(B) provides that: 
(B) A member shall not employ, associate professionally with, or aid a 
person the member knows or reasonably should know is a disbarred, 
suspended, resigned, or involuntarily inactive member to perform the 
following on behalf of the member’s client: 
(1) Render legal consultation or advice to the client; 
(2) Appear on behalf of a client in any hearing or proceeding or before 
any judicial officer, arbitrator, mediator, court, public agency, referee, 
magistrate, commissioner, or hearing officer; 
                                                          
 255.  Nancy Kaufman, The Prohibition Against Employment of Suspended or Disbarred 
Lawyers, MASS.GOV (Nov. 1998), http://www.mass.gov/obcbbo/employ.htm.  
 256.  MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 4:01 § 18(3). 
 257.  ILL. SUP. CT. R. 764(b). 
 258.  See Hope Viner Samborn, Disbarred—But Not Barred From Work, ABA J., June 2007, at 
57, 57  (presenting this interpretation).  
 259.  Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm’n, Formal Op. 1996-08 (1996) [hereinafter Ala. Op. No. 
1996-08], available at http://www.alabar.org/ogc/fopDisplay.cfm?oneId=380. 
 260.  See, e.g., PROCEDURES OF THE ARK. SUP. CT. REGULATING PROF’L CONDUCT OF 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW § 22 (2011), available at http://courts.arkansas.gov/professional_conduct/ 
documents/In_re_Procedures_of_the_Ark_Sup_Ct_Regulating_Prof_l_Conduct_of_Attorneys_at_L
aw.pdf (limiting law practice-related activities in which disbarred Arkansas lawyers may engage); 
COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(c) & (d) (2012) (establishing limits on work by disbarred 
or suspended lawyers); MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.8 (2011) (regulating lawyers’ 
employment of disbarred, suspended, or involuntarily inactive lawyers as nonlawyer assistants). 
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(3) Appear as a representative of the client at a deposition or other 
discovery matter; 
(4) Negotiate or transact any matter for or on behalf of the client with 
third parties; 
(5) Receive, disburse or otherwise handle the client’s funds; or 
(6) Engage in activities which constitute the practice of law.261 
Similarly, Georgia Rule of Professional Conduct 5.3(d) states that: 
d. a lawyer shall not allow any person who has been suspended or 
disbarred and who maintains a presence in an office where the practice 
of law is conducted by the lawyer, to: 
1. represent himself or herself as a lawyer or person with similar status; 
2. have any contact with the clients of the lawyer either in person, by 
telephone or in writing; or 
3. have any contact with persons who have legal dealings with the 
office either in person, by telephone or in writing.262 
Other states have limited disbarred or suspended lawyers’ activities 
as lay assistants through case law and ethics opinions.263  In In re 
Wilkinson,264 for example, the Kansas Supreme Court explained that a 
                                                          
 261.  CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-311(B) (2008). 
 262.  GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(d) (2012). 
 263.  See, e.g., In re Frabizzio, 508 A.2d 468, 469 (Del. 1986) (explaining that a lawyer who was 
suspended from practice for two years could “perform the tasks usually performed by law clerks and 
by paralegals . . . except that he [could] not have direct contact as a law clerk or paralegal with 
clients, witnesses, or prospective witnesses”); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Brennan, 714 
A.2d 157, 162 (Md. 1998) (stating that a disbarred or suspended lawyer may work as a paralegal 
“provided that proper procedures and constraints are in place to assure that the public in general, and 
clients in particular, are not confused as to the person’s status as a paralegal”); Ala. Op. No. 1996-
08, supra note 259 (listing restrictions on disbarred or suspended lawyers working as lay assistants 
and imposing conditions on employing lawyer); Neb. Op. No. 11-01, supra note 36, at 7 (imposing 
numerous conditions on disbarred or suspended lawyers’ activities when serving as nonlawyer 
assistants); N.C. State Bar, 98 Formal Op. 7 (1998), 1998 WL 609812, at *1–2 (permitting disbarred 
lawyers to work as paralegals except in the firm in which they practiced at the time of their 
disbarment); Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Adv. Op. 90-06 (1990), 1990 WL 
640501, at *2 [hereinafter Ohio Adv. Op. 90-06] (permitting disbarred lawyers to work as nonlawyer 
assistants and stating that employing lawyers must exercise “close supervisory control”); Or. State 
Bar Ass’n Bd. of Governors, Formal Op. 2005-24 (2005), 2005 WL 5679610, at *1 [hereinafter Or. 
Eth. Op. 2005-24] (prohibiting disbarred or suspended lawyers employed as nonlawyer assistants 
from sharing fees and practicing law). 
 264.  834 P.2d 1356 (Kan. 1992) (per curiam). 
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disbarred or suspended lawyer may “work as a law clerk, investigator, 
paralegal, or in any capacity as a lay person for a licensed attorney-
employer” if the person’s activities “are limited exclusively to work of a 
preparatory nature under the supervision of a licensed attorney-employer 
and [do] not involve client contact.”265 
Prudent lawyers will generally decline to employ or retain disbarred 
lawyers as lay assistants.  Any advantages that disbarred lawyers may 
appear to offer prospective legal employers are outweighed by the risks 
that such assistants pose,266 and by the time and expense associated with 
effectively supervising their activities.267  At the very least, lawyers and 
law firms should be “especially circumspect” about entering into any sort 
of business relationship with a disbarred lawyer.268  If lawyers or law 
firms employ or retain disbarred lawyers as nonlawyer assistants, in the 
absence of jurisdictional authority they should (a) not engage in 
compensation practices that could reasonably be construed as sharing 
fees with the person;269 (b) not allow the person to appear in a 
representative capacity outside the presence of a lawyer, and, even in the 
presence of a lawyer, make clear that the person is appearing only as the 
lawyer’s lay assistant; (c) not allow the person to have access to or 
control over client or law firm funds;270 (d) not permit the person to have 
any client contact outside the presence of a supervising lawyer;271 (e) not 
                                                          
 265.  Id. at 1362.  
 266.  See Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 
1998-1 (1998), 1998 WL 1557150, at *3 [hereinafter N.Y.C. Eth. Op. 1998-1] (“[E]mployment of a 
disbarred lawyer is fraught with ethical peril even with respect to activities that nonlawyers may 
properly engage in.  Courts may reasonably scrutinize [certain] activities and conclude that their 
performance by a disbarred lawyer poses greater risk to the public than their performance by a 
nonlawyer.”); see also Okla. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Adv. Op. 319 (2002), 2002 WL 
31990269, at *1 [hereinafter Okla. Adv. Op. 319] (quoting N.Y.C. Eth. Op. 1998-1 for the same 
proposition). 
 267.  See Ala. Op. No. 1996-08, supra note 259 (stating that disbarred or suspended lawyers 
working as nonlawyer assistants must be closely supervised and such supervision “must be 
continuous and regular”); Neb. Op. No. 11-01, supra note 36, at 7 (explaining that disbarred or 
suspended lawyers serving as lay assistants are restricted from performing many activities and 
imposing tight restrictions on their work); Ohio Adv. Op. 90-06, supra note 263, at *2 (requiring 
lawyers to “exercise close supervisory control” over disbarred lawyers functioning as nonlawyer 
assistants); Utah State Bar Ethics Adv. Op. Comm., Adv. Op. 99-02 (1999), 1999 WL 260749, at *2 
(stating that lawyers who employ disbarred or suspended lawyers as paralegals “should take special 
care to ensure adequate supervision” of these assistants). 
 268.  In re Discipio, 645 N.E.2d 906, 911 (Ill. 1994). 
 269.  Or. Eth. Op. 2005-24, supra note 263, at *1. 
 270.  See Ala. Op. No. 1996-08, supra note 259 (mentioning client funds). 
 271.  Neb. Op. No. 11-01, supra note 36, at 7. 
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permit the person to provide legal advice, guidance, or opinions;272 and 
(f) not permit the person to engage in any other activity that might be 
construed as the practice of law.273  This list is not exhaustive, and other 
restrictions or prohibitions may be appropriate in particular cases. 
Lawyers must supervise disbarred lawyers working as nonlawyer 
assistants more closely than they would supervise other lay assistants 
because of these assistants’ prior misconduct.274  This supervision must 
be “continuous and regular.”275  Supervising lawyers must review all 
assignments or tasks completed by disbarred lawyers working as 
nonlawyer assistants.276  For example, lawyers must review all 
correspondence and other documents prepared by disbarred lawyers 
functioning as nonlawyer assistants.277  If a lawyer employs or retains a 
disbarred lawyer to perform factual investigations in her capacity as a lay 
assistant, as disbarred lawyers are commonly permitted to do,278 the 
lawyer must carefully instruct her on the limits of her authority. 
These are stringent requirements.  In some instances, they may have 
the unfortunate effect of discouraging lawyers from employing or 
retaining disbarred lawyers as nonlawyer assistants, even though the 
would-be assistants deserve such opportunities.  That is, however, an 
acceptable side effect of legitimate client-protection efforts. 
C. Lawyers’ Use of Private Investigators 
Lawyers regularly retain private investigators in their practices.279  
Lawyers may rely on private investigators to perform background checks 
on prospective employees of clients, investigate parties’ or witnesses’ 
histories, locate and interview potential witnesses, expose suspected 
employment or housing discrimination, discover and document copyright 
and trademark infringement, conduct due diligence in advance of 
                                                          
 272.  Id.; Okla. Adv. Op. 319, supra note 266, at *1.   
 273.  N.Y.C. Eth. Op. 1998-1, supra note 266, at *7. 
 274.  Neb. Op. No. 11-01, supra note 36, at 7. 
 275.  Ala. Op. No. 1996-08, supra note 259. 
 276.  Neb. Op. No. 11-01, supra note 36, at 7. 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  See, e.g., In re Wilkinson, 834 P.2d 1356, 1362 (Kan. 1992) (per curiam) (stating that 
disbarred lawyers may work as investigators and paralegals); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. 
Brennan, 714 A.2d 157, 162 (Md. 1998) (observing that “[f]actual investigations, including the 
ascertainment of whether suitable medical, economic, or social resources exist that may be helpful to 
a client, may be undertaken by such persons”).  
 279.  Diane Saunders, Lessons from the Hewlett-Packard Spy Scandal, FOR THE DEF., Jan. 2007, 
at 76, 76.  
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anticipated acquisitions or mergers, or investigate employee fraud or 
other workplace misconduct, to name only some common 
responsibilities.280  Unfortunately, lawyers sometimes “leave too much to 
chance as to whether investigators will stay within the bounds of the law 
and the ethics rules that constrain lawyer conduct.”281 
Midwest Motor Sports v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc.282 exemplifies the 
risks that accompany lawyers’ use of private investigators.  The case 
arose out of a dispute in a South Dakota federal court between a 
snowmobile manufacturer, Arctic Cat, and two of its dealers, Elliott and 
A-Tech.  Elliott sued Arctic Cat for allegedly violating South Dakota 
franchise law by terminating Elliott’s franchise and installing A-Tech as 
a new franchise in the same city.283  Arctic Cat’s attorneys, Roger 
Damgaard and Timothy Shattuck, retained Adrian Mohr, a private 
investigator, to visit Elliott’s showroom to determine what products 
Elliott was promoting, what brands of snowmobiles were selling best, 
and whether Elliott was suffering financially from the loss of the Arctic 
Cat franchise.284  Mohr wore a hidden recording device to capture his 
conversations with dealer personnel.285  Damgaard and Shattuck did not 
script questions for Mohr to ask during his showroom visits, but they did 
indicate subjects they wanted him to address.286  When Mohr asked 
whether he could legally record conversations with represented parties, 
“they assured him that his conduct was legal, [but did not] discuss with 
him the ethics rules governing his conduct as their agent.”287 
Mohr twice visited the Elliott showroom posing as a customer and 
recorded his conversations with an Elliott salesman.288  Mohr also visited 
the A-Tech showroom, where he recorded a conversation with A-Tech’s 
president, Jon Becker.289  Again, Mohr knew of the lawsuit between 
Arctic Cat, Elliott, and A-Tech, and he further knew that Elliott and A-
Tech were represented by counsel.290  He did not, however, reveal to 
                                                          
 280.  See Joan C. Rogers, Scandals Involving Investigators Ensnare Lawyers, 22 LAW. MAN. ON 
PROF. CONDUCT 507, 507 (2006) (listing many of these activities).  
 281.  Id.   
 282.  347 F.3d 693 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 283.  Id. at 695. 
 284.  Id.  
 285.  Id.  
 286.  Id. at 695–96. 
 287.  Id. at 696.  
 288.  Id. 
 289.  Id. 
 290.  Id. 
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Elliott or A-Tech why he was visiting their dealerships, or that he was 
wearing a recording device.291  Mohr gave Damgaard and Shattuck 
copies of his recordings and snowmobile brochures that he picked up 
during his showroom visits.292  At the same time, Damgaard and 
Shattuck served Elliott and A-Tech with requests to inspect, photograph, 
and videotape their dealerships pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 34.293 
Elliott and A-Tech sought sanctions against Arctic Cat for Mohr’s 
clandestine activities.294  As a sanction, the district court excluded 
Mohr’s recordings and any evidence gleaned from them.295  Although the 
parties settled the franchise termination suit, they reserved the question 
of whether additional sanctions were appropriate.296  Both sides appealed 
sanctions issues to the Eighth Circuit. 
One of the issues on appeal was Arctic Cat’s counsel’s alleged 
violation of South Dakota Rule 4.2 and, more specifically, whether Mohr 
spoke with anyone at Elliott or A-Tech who effectively personified either 
entity.297  Of course, Mohr had spoken with A-Tech’s president, 
Becker.298  Damgaard and Shattuck tried to deflect responsibility for any 
violations to Mohr, saying that they directed him “to speak only to low-
level salespeople for the purpose of becoming familiar with the Arctic 
Cat line.”299  The Eighth Circuit was unmoved by their argument: 
[L]awyers cannot escape responsibility for the wrongdoing they 
supervise by asserting that it was their agents, not themselves, who 
committed the wrong.  Although Arctic Cat’s attorneys did not 
converse with Becker themselves, the Rules also prohibit contact 
performed by an investigator acting as counsel’s agent. . . .  “Since a 
lawyer is barred under Rule 4.2 from communicating with a 
represented party about the subject matter of the representation, she 
                                                          
 291.  Id.  
 292.  Id. 
 293.  Id. 
 294.  Id. at 697. 
 295.  Id. 
 296.  Id. at 695. 
 297.  Id. at 697.  South Dakota Rule 4.2 provided:  
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the 
representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the 
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by 
law or a court order. 
Id. (quoting S.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2).  
 298.  Id. at 696. 
 299.  Id. at 698. 
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may not circumvent the Rule by sending an investigator to do on her 
behalf that which she is herself forbidden to do.” . . .  In other words, an 
attorney is responsible for the misconduct of his nonlawyer employee 
or associate if the lawyer orders or ratifies the conduct. . . .  
Accordingly, we conclude that Arctic Cat’s attorneys are ethically 
responsible for Mohr’s conduct in communicating with Becker as if 
they had made the contact themselves.300 
The court was also bothered by Mohr’s conversations with Elliott’s 
salesman, “Bill,” who told him “that Elliott made a business decision to 
drop the Arctic Cat line”—a potentially damaging admission.301  Because 
Elliott’s counsel clearly would have advised Bill against making such a 
statement to Mohr, the court had “no doubt” that South Dakota Rule 4.2 
applied to Mohr’s conversation with Bill.302 
Although Damgaard’s and Shattuck’s South Dakota Rule 4.2 
violations alone justified the imposition of sanctions, the Eighth Circuit 
reasoned that sanctions were further justified by the “false and 
misleading pretenses” under which Mohr visited Elliott and A-Tech.303  
This was so even though South Dakota law permitted one party to a 
conversation to record that conversation without the other party’s 
consent or knowledge.304  “[C]onduct that is legal may not be ethical,” 
the court observed.305 
The court reasoned that nonconsensual recordings should be 
prohibited where they are accompanied by other indicia of unethical 
behavior.306  The South Dakota Rule 4.2 violations tipped the scales 
against Arctic Cat.  Furthermore, the “duty to refrain from conduct that 
involves deceit or misrepresentation should preclude any attorney from 
participating in the type of surreptitious conduct that occurred here.”307  
Arctic Cat employed Mohr in a ruse to gain an advantage at trial, 
triggering the South Dakota Rule 8.4(c) prohibition on “conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”308  The court 
also rejected Arctic Cat’s defense that it employed Mohr only after 
                                                          
 300.  Id. (citations omitted). 
 301.  Id. 
 302.  Id. 
 303.  Id. at 698–99. 
 304.  Id. at 699. 
 305.  Id.  
 306.  Id.  
 307.  Id. 
 308.  Id. at 700. 
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traditional discovery efforts failed.309  If Arctic Cat was frustrated by 
Elliott’s or A-Tech’s failure to cooperate in discovery, its remedy was a 
motion to compel discovery, not self-help.310 
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order 
excluding Mohr’s tapes and any derivative evidence.311  The Midwest 
Motor Sports court declined to impose monetary sanctions against Arctic 
Cat or its lawyers.312 
Midwest Motor Sports is not the only case of its type.  In In re 
Ositis,313 for example, the Oregon Supreme Court publicly reprimanded a 
lawyer who instructed a private investigator to pose as a journalist to 
interview a party to a potential dispute.314  Nor is courts’ willingness to 
hold lawyers accountable for investigators’ conduct a recent 
phenomenon.  Indeed, the risks attending lawyers’ involvement in 
investigations were highlighted nearly forty years ago in Noble v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co.315  In Noble, a private investigator hired by defense 
lawyers in a personal injury action slipped into the plaintiff’s hospital 
room and deceptively obtained the address of a key witness.316  The 
plaintiff sued the investigator and defense lawyers.317  The Noble court 
held that an unreasonably intrusive investigation such as this one may 
violate a plaintiff’s right to privacy.318  The court further found that the 
plaintiff could sue the defense lawyers for the investigator’s tortious 
conduct on vicarious liability principles, and that the lawyers might be 
directly liable for negligently hiring and supervising the investigator.319 
Lawyers who retain private investigators should exercise reasonable 
care in hiring.320  The determination of whether a lawyer exercised 
reasonable care will depend on the facts of the case, but there are some 
general guidelines that lawyers may wish to follow.  First, lawyers 
                                                          
 309.  Id. 
 310.  Id. 
 311.  Id. at 701. 
 312.  Id.  
 313.  40 P.3d 500 (Or. 2002) (per curiam). 
 314.  Id. at 504–05.   
 315.  109 Cal. Rptr. 269 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973). 
 316.  Id. at 271. 
 317.  Id. 
 318.  Id. at 272–73. 
 319.  Id. at 274–75. 
 320.  See Rebecca Graves Payne, Investigative Tactics: They May Be Legal, But Are They 
Ethical?, COLO. LAW., Jan. 2006, at 43, 49 (calling the selection of competent, ethical, and 
experienced investigators “of paramount importance”). 
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should ensure that investigators are properly licensed and hold any 
necessary business or professional permits.321  The lack of required 
licenses or permits is an automatic disqualifier.  Second, unless lawyers 
have prior satisfactory experience with an investigator, they should ask 
the investigator for references from other lawyers and check them before 
retaining the investigator.322  Third, lawyers should interview prospective 
investigators regarding their experience.323  Public law enforcement 
experience is generally a favorable qualification for an investigator 
because of the training law enforcement officers receive,324 although it 
obviously does not guarantee responsible conduct by the investigator.325  
Fourth, when hiring an investigative agency or company, lawyers should 
require the organization to identify the investigators who will be assigned 
to the matter.326  Lawyers should check those investigators’ 
qualifications.327  Fifth, lawyers should determine whether an 
investigator is a member of professional organizations with ethics codes 
or rules, or has earned certifications or designations reflecting special 
expertise or professional achievement.328  The lack of such credentials is 
not necessarily a basis to eliminate an investigator from consideration, 
but it may influence the selection of one investigator over another.  Sixth, 
lawyers should research prospective investigators online to see what 
others are saying or writing about them and, equally important, what they 
have posted online.329  Finally, where feasible, lawyers should “check 
with the appropriate licensing body to determine whether the investigator 
has been the subject of complaints or has been professionally 
disciplined.”330 
Once a lawyer selects a private investigator, the lawyer must instruct 
the investigator on the ethical and legal limits of the investigator’s 
conduct.331  The lawyer should document those instructions.332  
                                                          
 321.  RICHMOND ET AL., supra note 28, at 199; Robert L. Reibold, Hidden Dangers of Using 
Private Investigators, S.C. LAW., July 2005, at 18, 29. 
 322.  RICHMOND ET AL., supra note 28, at 199; Reibold, supra note 321, at 29. 
 323.  RICHMOND ET AL., supra note 28, at 199; Reibold, supra note 321, at 29. 
 324.  RICHMOND ET AL., supra note 28, at 199. 
 325.  Payne, supra note 320, at 49–50. 
 326.  RICHMOND ET AL., supra note 28, at 199; Reibold, supra note 321, at 29. 
 327.  RICHMOND ET AL., supra note 28, at 199. 
 328.  Id. 
 329.  Id. 
 330.  Id.  One commentator has described this step as “go[ing] the extra mile” where it requires a 
lawyer to make a Freedom of Information Act Request to obtain the information.  Reibold, supra 
note 321, at 29. 
 331.  RICHMOND ET AL., supra note 28, at 199. 
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Thereafter, the lawyer must pay attention to what the investigator is 
doing and provide reasonable guidance.  Admittedly, there is tension 
here.  If the lawyer has the right to control the details of the 
investigator’s work, the lawyer risks vicarious liability for any alleged 
misconduct by the investigator.333  At the same time, the investigator’s 
status as an independent contractor will not shield the lawyer against 
professional discipline for violating Rule 5.3(b) through inadequate 
supervision of the investigator’s activities.  In addition, there is at least 
some authority for the position that those who retain investigators 
sometimes owe a nondelegable duty to conduct the investigation 
lawfully, thus defeating any independent contractor defense.334 
In conclusion, lawyers are generally better advised to closely 
supervise private investigators’ activities than to attempt to distance 
themselves from them.  The former approach reduces the likelihood of 
alleged misconduct by investigators, while the latter tack affords no 
defense to professional discipline and may be of limited utility if a 
lawyer is forced to defend allegations of civil or criminal liability. 
D. Outsourcing 
“Outsourcing” describes the practice of sending work traditionally 
handled inside a law firm to an outside contractor for performance.335  
Law firms now outsource many of their back office functions, such as 
accounting, word processing, information management and technology, 
and human resources.336  In some instances, these functions are 
performed by nonlawyers working overseas or in domestic locations far 
from the firm’s offices, where wages are lower and benefits, if any, cost 
less.337  Firms also outsource work for clients to nonlawyers.  For 
                                                                                                                       
 332.  Id. 
 333.  Singletary v. Fridley, 762 So. 2d 692, 693–94 (La. Ct. App. 2000). 
 334.  See, e.g., Ellenberg v. Pinkerton’s, Inc., 188 S.E.2d 911, 914 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972) 
(recognizing nondelegable duty rendering independent contractor defense inapplicable where 
investigator allegedly violated plaintiff’s right to privacy); King v. Loessin, 572 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tex. 
App. 1978) (involving the retention of a private investigator to “perform a service unlawful in 
itself”).  
 335.  Brandon Robers, The Firm Is Flat: Ethical Implications of Legal Offshoring, 23 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 799, 800 (2010) (quoting Marcia L. Proctor, Considerations in Outsourcing Legal 
Work, MICH. B.J., Sept. 2005, at 20, 20). 
 336.  Mary C. Daly & Carole Silver, Flattening the World of Legal Services? The Ethical & 
Liability Minefields of Offshoring Legal & Law-Related Services, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 401, 404 
(2007); Kathryn A. Thompson, Still the Boss, ABA J., June 2006, at 26, 26.  
 337.   Elizabeth Dilts, Eastward Ho!, AM. LAW., Sept. 2012, at 26, 26; Amy Jo Ehman, What’s 
Happening in Back Office Outsourcing, PRACTICE LINK (2012), http://www.cba.org/cba/Practice 
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example, law firms may outsource various aspects of discovery and 
document review to outside paralegals.338  The advantage, again, is 
perceived cost savings.339  Perhaps the best and most basic example of 
lawyers outsourcing work for clients—and certainly the least 
controversial—is lawyers’ use of outside vendors to handle large 
photocopying projects, rather than having law firm staff make the copies. 
Bar ethics committees that have analyzed outsourcing have 
uniformly opined that the practice is generally permissible.340  Lawyers’ 
ability to fulfill their supervisory duties, however, has understandably 
been an area of focus. 
For example, in 2006 the New York City Bar Association—then 
known as the Association of the Bar of the City of New York—was 
asked whether a lawyer could ethically outsource legal support services 
overseas to lawyers not admitted to practice in New York or any other 
United States’ jurisdictions, or to laypersons and, relatedly, what issues 
the lawyer should consider in the process.341  The New York City Bar 
was initially concerned about the lawyer’s possible assistance of the 
foreign lawyers or laypersons in the unauthorized practice of law.342  To 
avoid aiding the unauthorized practice of law, the New York City Bar 
explained, “the lawyer must at every step shoulder complete 
responsibility for the non-lawyer’s work.  In short, the lawyer must . . . 
set the appropriate scope for the non-lawyer’s work and then vet the non-
lawyer’s work and ensure its quality.”343  After reciting lawyers’ 
supervisory obligations for other lawyers and nonlawyer assistants and 
noting the hurdles posed by the lawyer’s physical separation from the 
                                                                                                                       
Link/wwp/PrintHTML.aspx?DocId=31570.  
 338.  Robers, supra note 335, at 802. 
 339.  See Douglas R. Richmond, Outsourcing Legal Work . . . Do Professional Liability & 
Responsibility Go Along?, OF COUNSEL, Feb. 2005, at 5, 5 (stating by way of example that 
paralegals in the United States earn an average of $18 per hour, while paralegals in India earn 
between $6 and $8 per hour). 
 340.  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451 (2008); Fla. State Bar 
Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Adv. Op. 07-2 (2008), 2008 WL 3556663; L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n 
Prof’l Responsibility & Ethics Comm., Op. 518 (2006), http://www.lacba.org/Files/LAL/ 
Vol29No9/2317.pdf; N.H. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Comm., Adv. Op. 2011-12/5 (2011); The Ass’n of the 
Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Adv. Op. 2006-3 (2006), 2006 WL 
2389364 [hereinafter N.Y.C. Eth. Op. 2006-3]; N.C. State Bar, Formal Op. 12 (2008), 2008 WL 
5021151 [hereinafter 2007 N.C. Eth. Op. 12]; San Diego Cnty. Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 
2007-1 (2007), available at http://www.sdcba.org/index.cfm?Pg=ethicsopinion07-1.   
 341.  N.Y.C. Eth. Op. 2006-3, supra note 340, at *1. 
 342.  Id. at *2–3. 
 343.  Id. at *3. 
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prospective service provider,344 the New York City Bar asserted that the 
lawyer had to be “both vigilant and creative in discharging the duty to 
supervise.”345 
In attempting to formulate supervisory guidelines for the lawyer to 
follow, the New York City Bar prudently noted that each outsourcing 
situation is different.346  The Bar did, however, recommend the following 
“salutary steps”: 
(a) obtain background information about any intermediary employing 
or engaging the non-lawyer, and obtain the professional résumé of the 
non-lawyer; (b) conduct reference checks; (c) interview the non-lawyer 
in advance, for example, by telephone or by voice-over-internet 
protocol or by web cast, to ascertain the particular non-lawyer’s 
suitability for the particular assignment; and (d) communicate with the 
non-lawyer during the assignment to ensure that the non-lawyer 
understands the assignment and that the non-lawyer is discharging the 
assignment according to the lawyer’s expectations.347 
In 2008, the ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics & Professional 
Responsibility issued Formal Opinion 08-451 discussing lawyers’ 
obligations when outsourcing legal and nonlegal support services.348  The 
Committee specifically noted that Model Rule 5.3(b) applies to 
outsourced work performed by nonlawyers.349  Like the New York City 
Bar, the Committee recognized the supervisory challenges posed by 
outsourcing work to providers who are physically separated from the 
assigning lawyers and may be working in different time zones.350  The 
Committee acknowledged that electronic communications may close 
some associated gaps, but recognized that they may not always be 
adequate.351  As for supervisory guidelines, the Committee stated: 
At a minimum, a lawyer outsourcing services for ultimate provision to 
a client should consider conducting reference checks and investigating 
the background of the . . . nonlawyer providing the services as well as 
any nonlawyer intermediary involved, such as a placement agency or 
service provider. . . . When dealing with an intermediary, the lawyer 
                                                          
 344.  Id. at *3–4. 
 345.  Id. at *4. 
 346.  Id. 
 347.  Id. 
 348.  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451 (2008). 
 349.  Id. at 2–3. 
 350.  Id. at 3. 
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may wish to inquire into its hiring practices to evaluate the quality and 
character of the employees likely to have access to client information.  
Depending on the sensitivity of the information being provided to the 
service provider, the lawyer should consider investigating the security 
of the provider’s premises, computer network, and perhaps even its 
recycling and refuse disposal procedures.  In some instances, it may be 
prudent to pay a personal visit to the intermediary’s facility, regardless 
of its location or the difficulty of travel, to get a firsthand sense of its 
operation and the professionalism of the . . . nonlawyers it is 
procuring.352 
Outsourcing arrangements vary, and the measures required for 
lawyers to satisfy their supervisory obligations will accordingly differ by 
matter.353  As the ABA’s Ethics 20/20 Commission has recognized in 
proposing outsourcing-related amendments to the comments to Rule 5.3, 
the extent of a lawyer’s supervisory obligation will depend 
upon the circumstances, including the education, experience and 
reputation of the nonlawyer; the nature of the services involved; the 
terms of any arrangements concerning the protection of client 
information; and the legal and ethical environments of the jurisdictions 
in which the services will be performed, particularly with regard to 
confidentiality.354 
As a general rule, however, lawyers should consider taking the 
following steps to satisfy their duties under Rule 5.3.  First, lawyers 
ought to reasonably investigate the provider’s background and 
capabilities before engaging the company or person.355  Lawyers should 
request and check references for the provider.  Lawyers should satisfy 
themselves that a provider is competent to perform the intended 
assignment.  Second, lawyers should instruct the provider on 
confidentiality and conflict of interest issues before retaining the 
provider.356  Third, lawyers should carefully instruct the provider on the 
work to be performed and ensure that the provider understands the 
instructions.357  Fourth, lawyers ought to communicate with the provider 
during assignments to confirm that the provider’s performance meets 
                                                          
 352.  Id. 
 353.  See N.Y.C. Eth. Op. 2006-3, supra note 340, at *1 (noting that each outsourcing situation is 
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requirements.358  Finally, a lawyer should check the provider’s work 
upon completion of the assignment to establish that it was performed 
appropriately.359 
The fourth and fifth steps listed above in some cases can be 
complicated by clients’ expectations.  That is, a client may require a 
lawyer to outsource work to save money and, correspondingly, expect 
that the lawyer will not erase those savings by duplicating in any fashion 
the outsourced work.  Thus, a client may instruct a lawyer not to involve 
herself in the work being outsourced, or refuse to pay for her services if 
she does.  Presently, Rule 5.3 does not anticipate or address this collision 
between a client’s interests and a lawyer’s supervisory obligations.  But, 
because Rule 5.3 exists to protect clients’ interests,360 lawyers should be 
able to ethically honor clients’ demands for reduced supervision of 
nonlawyers.  As for practical guidance, lawyers facing this scenario 
should counsel the client about the potential risks of limiting the lawyer’s 
supervision of the outsourced work, document that consultation and the 
client’s instructions, inform the client of any developments that might 
cause the client to alter its instructions, and create a record of the 
lawyer’s and the service provider’s related responsibilities. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Lawyers depend on the efforts and support of many different 
nonlawyer assistants in their practices.  Law firms could not operate 
without nonlawyer staff.  Lawyers reach outside their firms for assistance 
from appraisers, private investigators, process servers, e-discovery 
vendors, and others.  Law firms outsource various projects to a range of 
service providers.  The list of nonlawyers who regularly assist lawyers in 
their practices is long. 
Unfortunately, lawyers’ lay assistants sometimes err and 
occasionally commit intentional misconduct.  Lawyers called to account 
for problems caused by nonlawyer assistants’ misconduct generally 
cannot deflect responsibility to the assistants.  Model Rule of 
                                                          
 358.  N.Y.C. Eth. Op. 2006-3, supra note 340, at *4; 2007 N.C. Eth. Op. 12, supra note 340, at 
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 360.  See ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 7, § 5.3–1, at 1006 (“Clients hire lawyers and 
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Professional Conduct 5.3 and equivalent state rules frequently prohibit 
lawyers from disavowing responsibility for assistants’ conduct by 
imposing broad supervisory responsibilities on lawyers.  Lawyers must 
understand their supervisory obligations and work diligently to fulfill 
them.  The many cases in which courts have found Rule 5.3 violations 
highlight the importance of lawyers’ supervisory responsibilities for lay 
assistants and, equally, demonstrate how easy it is for lawyers to fail in 
their duties.  There may be many reasons for these lapses, but there are 
no satisfactory excuses. 
 
